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The exploitation of a single oil field by several firms is a typical example
of the common pool externality (CPE). As a possible solution to it, regulators
have innovated policies that allow such firms to coordinate by selecting a
single operator to exploit the whole field. Moreover, every state, but Texas,
can even force firms to join a coalition. In this dissertation I analyze the
dynamic strategic interaction of firms competing for common resources. By
modeling such dynamic interactions, I will be able to counterfactually assess
what would happen under different regulatory scenarios. I use the model,
along with other techniques, to quantify the loss in production and profits
due to the common pool externaliy; then I explore how implementing different
policies that promote or enforce coalition formation would change productivity
and welfare.
This research is has three main parts. In Chapter 2, I explore the
most important institutional details, and simulate how the characteristics of a
iv
reservoir, the composition of the hydrocarbons, and the distribution of firms in
a field affect the outcome of coordination. In Chapter 3, I use different reduced
form techniques to estimate how implementing compulsory unitization in New
Mexico has improved welfare. In Chapter 4, I develop a random stopping
model and estimate the parameters using the methodology developed by Bajari
and Levin, 2007. Once the parameters of the model are estimated, I will
be able to explore my different research questions. The results suggest that
relaxing the restrictions in voluntary unitization would increase welfare at a
lesser scale than implementing compulsory unitization. Nevertheless, none of
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The exploitation of a single oilfield by several firms is a typical example
of the common pool externality (CPE). Pressure is the natural force that
pushes oil up to the surface when firms are trying to extract it. Increasing the
rate of production makes the pressure in the reservoir fall at a much faster rate,
making it inefficient to extract too fast. Nevertheless, when several firms share
an oilfield, they have incentives to produce faster than they would otherwise.
This happens because the rule of capture in the United States dictates that
regardless of where the hydrocarbons are originally found, whoever extracts
them first is entitled to keep them (Homan, 2011).
If agents facing the CPE assigned a single operator to exploit the whole
resource, then such operator would not face the CPE. In that sense, such
operator would extract the oil efficiently. In the oil business, there is a legal
contract called unitization that allows firms to coordinate in such a way when
exploiting a field. Regulators across the United States impose two restrictions
when firms seek to unitize: first, the field needs to be “reasonably developed”;
second, the way in which firms share profits must be “fair.” The problem with
the first restriction is that if firms start working separately before unitizing,
1
they might start exploiting the field inefficiently. The problem with the second
restriction is that by restricting the profit sharing options, firms might not
reach some unitization agreements they would otherwise.
Libecap, 1998 documented that unitization agreements do not happen
as often as regulators would expect. The failure in private contracting has en-
couraged oil regulating agencies around the United States to incorporate com-
pulsory unitization to their production-efficiency-enhancement toolkit. Under
compulsory unitization, if the number of firms in a field that want to form a
unit exceeds a certain threshold, then the regulator can force the dissidents to
also join the unit. The minimum threshold varies widely in different states.
Texas is the only major producing state without any form compulsory uniti-
zation.
In this dissertation, I first model how firms that share fields and ex-
tract oil and gas take the actions of others into account when deciding their
production schedule. Then, using reduce form techniques, I compare Texas
and New Mexico to conclude that wells in New Mexico are more productive
than wells in Texas. Finally, I estimate a random stopping model that will
allow me to prove three counterfactuals: how big is the welfare loss due to
the common pool externality; what would happen if there was compulsory
unitization in Texas; and how efficiency would improve if Texas relaxed the
restrictions placed on voluntary unitization.
In Chapter 2, I review the institutional details necessary to understand
the common pool externality faced by firms that share the same field. I also
2
propose a dynamic model of how firms interact. Through a simulation exercise,
I explain how a single firm exploiting a field can produce more efficiently. Also,
I show that compulsory unitization could also increase efficiency in production
if certain conditions are met.
In Chapter 3, I use data provided by DrillingInfo1 to estimate a re-
gression discontinuity (RD) and a difference in difference (DID) model. Using
these techniques, I compare production between Texas and New Mexico. In
particular, I try to isolate how compulsory unitization has increased efficiency
in New Mexico compared to Texas. For RD, I use the fact that Texas and
New Mexico share a large border and the area around it has been heavily
drilled. For DID, I leverage from the fact that I have data before and after
the implementation of compulsory unitization in New Mexico.
The main results of Chapter 3 suggest that wells in New Mexico are
more productive than wells in Texas. The leading results I got by applying RD
suggest that the increase in productivity due to New Mexico policy is between
2,239 and 2,664 barrels of oil over the lifetime of the well. The DID approach
suggests that the productivity increase due to implementing compulsory uni-
tization in New Mexico is between 2,551 and 3,872.
Chapter 4 is, by far, the most important in the dissertation. It proposes
a random stopping model that rationalizes how firms take drilling and unitiza-
tion decisions. I use a unique dataset I constructed from different sources2 and
1http://info.drillinginfo.com
2DrillingInfo (http://info.drillinginfo.com), Texas Railroad Commission
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the methodology proposed by Bajari and Levin, 2007 to estimate the parame-
ters of the model. I then used the model to recompute the dynamic equilibrium
for each field to compute the main counterfactuals in the dissertation.
The results in Chapter 4 suggest that if there was a single operator per
field exploiting it since discovery, then profits from that field would increase
in around 26%. If the Texas Railroad Commission (TRRC) relaxed both
restrictions it places in voluntary unitization, then welfare would increase in
around 21%. Finally, this model suggests that if compulsory unitization was
allowed in Texas, then welfare would increase in around 13%.




Unitization: Is it always worth the hassle?
2.1 Introduction
Sharing a reservoir is a typical example of the common pool external-
ity faced by the oil and gas industry. Firms have tried to deal with it using
mainly two mechanisms: proration quotas and unitization of tracts. The for-
mer is usually easier to achieve through private contracting; the latter, when
achieved, yields a better outcome. By 1947, only 12 of 3,000 fields in the
United States were fully unitized (Libecap, 1984). This failure in private con-
tracting motivated regulating agencies to impose severe legislation trying to
increase efficiency by reducing over-exploitation. By now, every producing
state regulates well spacing and enforces pooling. Moreover, they all encour-
age firms sharing a field to work as a unit1. Nevertheless, they have different
stands when it comes to compulsory unitization. Texas is the only major pro-
ducing state that does not enforces it. Other states will act as long as the
proportion of operators that want to unitize exceeds the minimum established
by the state. It goes from 50% to 85%.
Supported by the growing economic literature, there is consensus among
1The difference between pooling and unitization will be explained in the following section
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firms and legislators that unitization is among the best ways to reduce the
excessive exploitation of a resource caused by the common pool externality
(Balthrop, 2016, Kaffine, 2011, Schott, 2007, Uchida, 2008). Nevertheless,
making it compulsory is not as popular among stakeholders. Legislators that
oppose unitization argue that this prevents small firms from learning by doing.
Moreover, non-unitized firms with small tracts usually benefit by increasing
their production rate. The amount of product they capture from their neigh-
bors outweighs the depletion of pressure caused by overproducing. Coinciden-
tally, states that oppose compulsory unitization have a large concentration of
influential small firms (Libecap, 1985b).
Every reservoir is different and the economic benefits gained from hav-
ing a single operator vary widely among them. For example, if the permeability
of the rocks where the hydrocarbons are trapped is low, firms will not be able
to capture their neighbor’s product, so they will not have incentives to produce
too fast. The main objective of this paper is to find out how oil recovery and
profits will increase by unitizing tracts given reservoir characteristics and the
composition of firms with interests in a field. As a side product, the paper will
give a structural framework to analyze why small firms oppose unitization,
and when it will be achieved by private contracting.
There is a vast literature in petroleum engineering that models the dy-
namics of a reservoir that could enlighten us with the relationship between
overproduction and waste. Economics literature states that the composition
-number and size- of firms with interests in a reservoir also matters (Libecap,
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1984). The objective of my paper is to bring these two approaches together to
explore how reservoir characteristics, and firm composition influence unitiza-
tion outcomes. Moreover, the multistage general equilibrium model presented
here is the only one in this literature that accounts for two substances -oil
and gas- in estimating how pressure evolves. This feature is of paramount
importance, since depletion of gas is the main mechanism why fast production
decreases recovery.
The following section will describe the institutional details relevant to
the current application, both from a legal and a technical perspective. It will
also define related terms like pooling and unitization. Finally, it documents
an interview with a well operator that helped understand the cost function.
In section 2, I explore the existing literature. First, I describe how economists
have approached pooling and unitization in different markets. Then, I briefly
comment on some legal and technical papers. Section 3 presents the structural
model and the optimality conditions. Section 4 shows how the model performs
by simulating different instances. Finally, section 5 concludes and proposes
further research.
2.2 Background
Many authors that study the oil and gas industry do not distinguish
between pooling and unitization (Covert, 2014 and Balthrop, 2016). Pooling
is the combining of tracts within a single well-spacing unit. Unitization, on
the other hand, is a reservoir-wide combination of tracts. The objective of
7
the former is to enable single operators to fulfill space regulations, the latter
is the coalition between several operators to exploit the reservoir efficiently
(Handlan, 1984). Most legislatures have similar clauses on compulsory pooling,
while compulsory unitization varies greatly between states (Kramer, 2007).
Solely based on the previous definitions, it appears that the only differ-
ence between pooling and unitization is the scale. In practice there are many
others, the first one being the purpose. Pooling tracts enables firms to fulfill
minimum space requirements to drill, the purpose of unitization is to reduce
drilling. Pooling is a contract between an operator and mineral owners, uni-
tization happens between firms. Pooling has to be agreed or enforced before
drilling, units can formed at any point. The economic implications of pooling
and unitization also differ greatly. The former incites drilling. It allows firms
to fulfill their requirements even if some mineral owners oppose. The further
prevents firms from drilling too fast. Unitized firms (units) save on investment
by reducing the number of wells2.
Rent dissipation caused by the common pool externality in this indus-
try comes from high capital costs - excessive storage space and duplicated
wells- and from reduced recovery. When many tracts are unitized (either vol-
untarily of compulsory), only the operator with more acreage will exploit the
reservoir. He will decide how many wells to operate and daily production
rates. Moreover, if secondary recovery is needed, he will decide what wells
2More on this in the literature review
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to transform into injectors. The other operators will pay their proportion of
capital and costs and once the oil is sold, the operator will disburse the rents
across stakeholders (Commission, 1984).
2.2.1 Legal Schemes
In Texas, the oil and gas regulatory agency is the Texas Railroad Com-
mission (TRRC). The first effective spacing legislation was rule 37, in 1919,
which establishes that “No well for oil, gas or geothermal resource shall here-
after be drilled nearer than 1,200 feet to any well completed in or drilling to
the same horizon on the same tract or farm, and no well shall be drilled nearer
than 467 feet to any property line, lease line or subdivision line”. Before that,
the prevailing practice was the rule of capture, where “The owner of a tract
of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled
thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil and gas migrated from
adjoining lands” (Hardwicke, 1948). This incentivized over investment, and
overproduction, which resulted in unnecessary waste.
Texas was the last major oil producing state that took an opposing
stance to compulsory pooling. It wasn’t until 1965, when the TRRC passed
the Mineral Interest Pooling Act (Kramer, 2007), which states compulsory
pooling as an option once all voluntary efforts have been exhausted (Coe,
1977). Moreover, it states that “the production shall be allocated to the
respective tracts within the unit in the proportion that the number of surface
acres included within each tract bears to the number of surface acres included
9
in the entire unit.”
Unlike spacing and pooling acts, Texas does not have an analogous act
that enforces involuntary unitization (Kramer, 1986). Nevertheless, the Texas
Court highly encourages it, as long as it“yields a reasonable expectation of
profit”, and the agreement is voluntary (SC, 1981). There have been important
efforts to introduce forced unitization. The latest is House Bill 100, the “Oil
and Gas Majority Rights Protection Act”, introduced by Rep. Van Taylor
in 2013. The bill authorizes interest owners to apply to the TRRC for an
order for unit operations of a common source of supply. During the hearing
applicants must prove that they have exhausted all voluntary efforts and that
the incremental recovery reasonably exceeds the costs. The minimum consent
proposed in the act is 70%. The share of production must measure the value
of each tract, taking into account acreage quality of oil, geological structure
and other factors.
All of the other producing states have incorporated compulsory uniti-
zation clauses to their legislation. The usual way is to enforce it when the
percentage of operators that agree is greater than a certain minimum. For
example, Tennessee has a 50%, Kentucky has a 51%, New York a 60%. Ohio’s
minimum consent level is 65%, while Alabama is 66.66%, Mississippi has 75%
and North Dakota a 50% (Kramer, 2007). They also emphasize that there
needs to be an assessment that proves that there will be an important eco-
nomic benefit, recovery will increase, and if the unit is not reservoir-wide they
will not harm other operators.
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2.2.2 Reservoir Engineering Basics
Spacing rules help prevent mineral owners from capturing hydrocar-
bons outside their tracts. Nevertheless, operators sharing a common supply
source are subject to its natural pressure, which can be reduced significantly
when neighbors drill too much and produce too fast. Depletion of pressure is
the main reason why overproduction leads to reduced recovery rates. A direct
effect of unitization is reducing pressure depletion. Having a basic understand-
ing of the dynamics of pressure is paramount to understand how unitization
can mitigate the common pool externality and improve recovery. The objec-
tive of this section is to provide basic understanding of the mechanism driving
pressure evolution in a hydrocarbons pool.
Reservoirs usually contain gas, liquid oil, and water. The gas can be
completely dissolved in the liquid (unsaturated reservoir), or be partially dis-
solved and form a gas cap above the liquid (saturated reservoir). Most oils
have lower density than water so they float above it. During the exploration
phase, engineers estimate the pressure-volume-temperature characteristics of
the hydrocarbons and the rocks in the reservoir to draw a map called the
pressure-temperature diagram, which will determine if the reservoir is a gas or
an oil one. Temperature is actually what determines if a reservoir is a gas or
an oil one.
The difference in pressure between the reservoir and the wellbore is
the force that make fluids travel to the well. The saturation state and water
content will determine the driving mechanism that will push the oils towards
11
Figure 2.1: Pressure Temperature Diagram
Picture based on Owusul P., 2013
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the well. An unsaturated reservoir, has a depletion-drive, which means that the
oil be pushed by the bubbles of gas dissolved in it. On saturated reservoirs the
expansion of the gas cap forces the oil to move, they are cap-driven. Finally,
when the oil is moved by the pressure ejected by the water underneath it, it is
said to be water-driven. See figure 2.2 for an illustration. This classification
Figure 2.2: Drives
Source: Kansas Geological Survey 2001 at
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/Publications/Oil/primer13.html
is important because it will determine how pressure will evolve as a function
of production. It turns out that depletion-driven reservoirs are the fastest to
lose pressure, and have a recovery factor between 5% and 30%. Cap-driven
reservoirs follow with a recovery factor between 20% and 40%. Water-driven
reservoirs tend to last longer and have a greater recovery factor. The drive also
determines how the gas-to-oil (GOR) ratio will evolve. Figure 2.1 shows how
a depletion-driven reservoir will perform. Before point Pb (bubble point) is
reached, pressure will drop very fast, and the gas will be completely dissolved
in the oil. This will make the GOR constant. At Pb, a gas cap will start to
grow above the oil in the reservoir. This happens because at a pressure bellow
13
point Pb, some of the gas dissolved in the oil will stay in the reservoir, and the
GOR will not be constant anymore. The functional form of pressure and the
GOR of the model in this paper assumes a cap-drive reservoir, the common
pool externality would be even greater in a depletion-driven one.
Reservoirs that do not have enough pressure to lift oil to surface relay
on artificial lifting mechanism. Around 95% of all the producing wells in the
United States use one of them. More than 80% of such use pumpjacks. A
pumpjack inserts a rod into the well with a barrel attached. The barrel has a
valve at the bottom which opens when the pumpjack strokes down filling the
barrel with the reservoir fluid, and it closes when it moves up. Every up-stroke
the bottomhole pressure decreases, and fluid from the reservoir moves towards
the wellbore. To control the bottomhole pressure, they use a pump and adjust
the number of strokes the pumpjack gives every minute.
To give some perspective, a well fractured in the Eagle Ford Shale can
give around 400 barrels each day then decrease exponentially until it stabi-
lizes at around 20% for several years. Of course this depends on the drive,
and other characteristics of the reservoir, like the permeability of the rock.
Once the reservoir pressure is not enough to move the hydrocarbon to the
wellbore, operators evaluate how convenient it is to start a secondary recovery
phase. During this phase operators inject energy (in form of heat, water, co2,
bacteria) to the reservoir to increase pressure or reduce the viscosity of the hy-
drocarbon.To execute the secondary recovery phase, either more wells will be
drilled, or some existing ones will be converted into injection wells. Unitizing
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leads to a more efficient execution of this face execution of this phase. When
competing, some operators would rather wait and benefit from their neighbors
injecting energy to the reservoir than doing it themselves.
2.2.3 Decision Making and Costs
The legal controversy surrounding compulsory unitization helped un-
derstand the importance of the issue at hand.The technical aspects governing
a reservoir will help modeling the evolution of pressure, oil and gas in a reser-
voir. To complete the model, it is also important to have some perspective on
the costs related to production, and how agents (operators) make decisions.
To achieve that, I visited operations of a well drilled in Gonzales County above
the Eagle Ford Shale. The operator explained that the business is dominated
by sunk costs. The first is the drilling and hydraulic fracturing services which
are usually performed by contractors, in this case Schlumberger. The sec-
ond is leasing mineral rights from land owners. One horizontal well requires
at least 40 acres, and in a well explored area, mineral owners could charge
up to $10,000 per acre (plus a percentage of the revenue). These costs are
paid upfront and will not be recovered. Firms also need a pumpjack and sur-
face storage which will be installed for several years. These investments can
be resold but after 20 years of operation its scrap value is usually negligible,
especially compared to the sunk costs.
Variable costs are maintenance, transportation, fuel, taxes and the min-
eral rights lease. Maintenance and fuel are negligible. Mineral owners usually
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charge a fixed proportion part of the sale. On an explored area this propor-
tional part could go up to 25%. Sales tax is around 7.5% in the Eagle Ford
region. Transportation is usually contracted, and they also charge a fixed part
per barrel of oil, it could be around 2.5%. In this case, the oil was bought by
a third party that homogenize quality at around 90% of the WTI price. This
means that even a well on a mature reservoir producing only 10 barrels per
day will give profits of around $15,000 each month. The process is completely
automated, the pumpjack feeds the storage tanks, once a week the contracted
transportation gathers the oil from the tanks, and takes it to the buyer, who
pay directly to each stakeholder each month.
Finally, the operator explained that bottomhole pressure and extraction
rates are decide based on technical issues, and not on the market price. Price
of oil, and forecasts will be considered before incurring sunk costs, but it will
not affect operations after such costs are covered.
2.3 Literature Review
Oil production, at the firm’s level, is an interdisciplinary topic. Impor-
tant papers have been published, not only analyzing the economics of uniti-
zation, but also legal and technical aspects of it. Law scholars have focused
on the comparing and contrasting the efficiency of rules in different states.
Petroleum engineers focus on optimizing a well or a reservoir, but not taking
into account ownership of mineral rights, nor the organization of firms exploit-
ing a common source. Economists have studied the common pool externality
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in several industries, the most prominent applications have been in the fishery
industry.
When analyzing different states, law scholars usually champion forced
pooling and unitization. Kramer, 2007 focuses on contrasting spacing legisla-
tion, and forced pooling and unitization between different states with Texas.
Throughout the paper, he proves that Texas has been a slow adopter of waste-
preventing legislation. He concludes that although the TRRC facilitates start-
ing operations more than any other agency, recovery could improve with forced
unitization. Behrens, 2013 analyzes rule 37 and reaches the same conclusion
than Kramer. Handlan, 1984 survey compulsory unitization laws across major
producing states, they emphasize that the greatest difference comes from the
rate of consent required to enforce it.
An important branch of petroleum engineering deals with well opti-
mization (Guyaguler, 2002, Lo, 1995). Some scholars focus on the optimal rate
of extraction of oil and gas. For example, Attra, 1961 uses linear programming
to find the optimal rate subject to production capacities and reservoir injection.
Lo, 1995 maximize daily production by allocating well rates subject to flow
rate constraints. Moreover, there are commercial simulators that use ad hoc
rules to optimize wells ( GEOQUEST, 2000 and LANDMARK, 2001). Reser-
voir optimization goes beyond production rates. Another important branch
combines well daily production rates and well placement. Bittencourt, 1997
use genetic algorithms to optimize a reservoir when decision variables are well
placement and well production rates. Guyaguler, 2002 used utility theory to
17
quantify the uncertainty in reservoir developments. Yeten, 2002 investigated
the problem of placing horizontal wells.
Garrett Hardin’s seminal paper “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin,
1968) ignited a vast empirical literature describing industries facing the com-
mon pool externality (McCay, 1987, McGoodwin, 1990, Ostrom, 1990). Fur-
ther studies suggest that unitization could be an efficient solution to this prob-
lem (Balthrop, 2016, Anderson, 2000). Most economists that are intrigued
with pooling and unitization as a solution to the common-pool externality
study either fisheries around the world (successful contracting cases), or why
private contracting usually fails in the oil and gas industry.
The fishing industry offers several examples on how firms cooperate
to mitigate the common pool externality. Schott, 2007 proposes a theoreti-
cal framework in which fishermen decide the effort they will exert to maxi-
mize their profits. The model he uses is a static one, so instead of focusing
on resource depletion, he studies how firms reduce overcrowding. He com-
pares different solutions, like prorationing, and concludes that the best way
to achieve efficiency is by having several free-riders and a few active fishers
that share profits, it is the same principle that unitization in the oil industry.
Aburto et al 2008 document how fishing cooperatives in Mexico work. They
propose a dynamic model to explain the common pool externality and use a
natural weather shock, El Niño Southern variation, to estimate their results.
They conclude that during “bad times” cooperatives are more likely to honor
agreements.
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Kaffine, 2011 propose a spatial dynamic model and conclude that com-
pulsory unitization is also a good option for fisheries, as long as it is complete.
They shows that partial unitization might be even worse than working sep-
arately. Uchida, 2008 describe an emblematic success story in Suruga Bay,
Japan: the Sakureabi Fishery. They explain how fishermen went from indi-
vidual competition to grouping up in 5 efficient units. They argue that “While
competition among individuals within a group was removed, group competi-
tion among districts became intense”. To deal with that new problem, the 5
districts started working as a single unit. Finally, McWhinnie, 2009 develops a
theoretical model concluding that increasing productivity among competitors
will exacerbate depletion of the common pool. She surveys 200 pooled fisheries
around the world and concludes that overproduction is worse where there are
partial cooperative agreements. She explains that when fisheries reduce their
marginal cost, competition becomes more fierce accelerating production.
This set of papers shad some light on the difference between the eco-
nomic implications of pooling and unitization. In the oil industry pooling
enables more wells, which is analogous to increase productivity in fisheries,
and that exacerbates depletion. In both markets, complete unitization in-
centivize operators to achieve the efficient outcome, which reduces depletion.
Surveying these papers also illustrate that, although pooling contracts can be
analogous in the oil and fishery industries, the characteristics of each indus-
try makes their implementation and implications very different. First of all,
papers on the fishery industry pay too much attention to nonlinear variable
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costs (effort), variable costs in oil recovery are linear and negligible. Moreover
partial unitization (different to pooling) might help oil recovery, it will worsen
fish preservation.
Some authors study how stakeholders in the oil industry have dealt
with the common pool externality. Most of the literature focus on explaining
why private contracting usually fails. Libecap, 1984 survey three contractual
solutions that private firms tried several times during the 20th century: lease
consolidation (partial unitization), production under a single firm (full uniti-
zation) and prorationing of output. The latter became the dominant solution
adopted privately. Production shares were initially determined by the num-
ber of wells, which led to over-drilling and rent disruption. Unitization was
implemented only when there were few interests in a reservoir. Contracts typ-
ically failed because parties needed to agree on the value of different tracts
beforehand. On a different paper Libecap, 1985c argue that private contract-
ing is usually not possible due to heterogeneous information. Firms explore
different regions of a reservoir, and use different methodologies to estimate its
value. When trying to assign value to different tracts, this turns out to be an
important barrier.
Libecap, 1985b go beyond failure in private contracting and analyze
why regulation has also failed, especially in Texas. Using a very simple reduced
form model, they conclude that compulsory unitization rules were approved
first in states where small firms, which are usually against unitization, are
not very influential. They compare several fields in Texas, Oklahoma and
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Wyoming. In Texas there are many small tracts and small firms are influential,
not surprisingly compulsory unitization has not been achieved. Reservoirs in
Wyoming are in federal land, and the Federal Government only allows unitized
firms to exploit them. The authors attribute that to the fact that small firm
hardly influence Federal legislation. Oklahoma is a middle ground between
these two situations, tracts and (the median) of firms are bigger than in Texas
and legislation is more progressive.
Very few empirical papers have tried to prove how unitization increases
recovery. Balthrop, 2016 uses a difference in difference approach to estimate
the effect of unitization in lifetime production of wells in the Anadarko region.
They show that Texan wells in the Oklahoma-Texas border are less productive
than Oklahomans. Although the number of unitized wells in that region is low,
they attribute this increase of productivity in Oklahoma to unitization. This
paper fails to recognize all the other different factors in legislation between
both states.
Finally, Liabecap, 2001 develop a model that suggests that under some
specific circumstances it is impossible to identify a sharing rule such that
unitization Pareto-dominates the initial endowments. The main contribution
of this paper is that it is the only economic paper that exploits the presence
of oil and gas in the reservoir (not only oil). They explain that if there are
two firms sharing a reservoir, and firm one has a bigger interest in gas than
oil and vice-versa, then unitization might yield a distribution of risk that
makes firms worst than they were with their initial endowments. The model
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I will present here also exploits the fact that reservoirs have more than one
substance. Nevertheless both models are fundamentally different, mine focuses
on dynamics and Libecap’s is a static one.
2.4 Model
As discussed in the background section, accelerated oil production leads
to lower overall recovery. Since the viscosity of gas is lower than oil’s it travels
faster. Moreover, the speed difference is an increasing function of pressure
change, which implies that as production rate increases, gas escapes faster. In
cap-driven and depletion-driven reservoirs the gas in the reservoir generates
the pressure that makes the oil move to the wellbore. Lack of gas means lack
of pressure, which translates into oil trapped. The results presented here will
assume that gas is flared, which is a very common practice, especially in new
developments lacking pipelines (Seeley, 2014).
The model proposed in this section captures these ideas to assess how
the composition of firms sharing a common supply will impact overall oil re-
covery. The existing literature suggests that single firms, and big operators
will produce slower than multiple firms and small operators. Moreover, it is
documented that big firms prefer to unitize, and small firms benefit from over-
production. The model will yield all these results. Finally, the hydrocarbons
and rock characteristics also matter. For example, if the oil-to-gas ratio is high
and the oil viscosity low, overproduction will not hurt recovery too much. The
the model will explain how this affects unitization.
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First suppose there is only one operator. Assume that the initial oil and
gas in the reservoir at time t are Tot and Tgt respectively. The rate of extraction
of both substances depends on the difference between the bottomhole pressure
and the reservoir pressure. Let Pbt be the bottomhole pressure induced by
the operator and Prt be the average reservoir pressure at time t. Assume
that each substance’s production rate depends on this difference in pressure
as shown in equation 2.1.




where i = o if the substance is oil and i = g if it is gas, and W is the number
of wells the operator has drilled in the reservoir.
This functional form has some features worth mentioning. The param-
eters are α and β, they will dictate the difference in extraction rate between
both substances. Since gas moves faster than oil, and the difference in speed
is increasing with the change in pressure, we expect βg > βo. The difference
of speed depends on viscosity, so βo and βg will be the viscosity parameters.
The difference in αs will homogenize volume unit between oil and gas, and
the scale will be a proxy for permeability3. Moreover, the proportion of each
hydrocarbon impacts the rate of extraction. If there is much more oil than
gas, regardless of the difference in pressure, production of oil will be higher.
I will assume that the number of wells is given, note that having more wells
3Permeability of rock and viscosity are the most important characteristics that determine
how substances will react to a change in pressure.
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will help decrease the amount of gas wasted4. This happens because the same
amount of oil can be extracted by inducing a higher bottomhole pressure in
separate spots of the reservoir.
Pressure is a function of mass in the reservoir and its volume5. Initial
oil, gas and pressure will also be important parameters of the model. Pressure
will decrease as cumulative production of oil and gas increases. Let TI =
To0 + Tg0 be the initial substance in the pool, and PI be the initial pressure.
Cumulative substance produced at time t will then be ct = TI −Tot−Tgt. The














where a ∈ [0, 1] establishes the linearity of the relation between pressure and
production (Ahmed, 2000). Note that before production starts c0 = 0 =⇒
Pr0 = PrI , and that Ct = TI =⇒ Prt = 0.
Equations 2.1 and 2.2 describe the dynamics of a reservoir. They are
a very simplified version of a reservoir simulator. Petroleum engineers have
developed very accurate reservoir simulators based on Darcy equation and the
material balance equation. They deal with complicated features most reser-
voirs have, for example: multiple drives; uneven permeability, viscosity and
composition throughout the reservoir; and well placement. The simplification
4It is straight forward to endogenize number of wells in the model. Nevertheless, it will
complicate optimality conditions and make simulation slower. Remember that the focus of
this paper is recovery rate and not over-investment. See further research in Conclusions.
5... and many other factor like temperature which will not be considered here.
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used in this paper is good for its purpose, though it would be interesting to
further estimate this model with real data, and using one of these simulators
could yield very accurate results.
Each period, operators will observe the amount of oil and gas left in
the reservoir and decide the bottomhole pressure they will induce. This policy
function is the last ingredient we need to describe how pressure, gas depletion
and oil production will evolve in the reservoir. I will assume operators cannot
exert a minimum bottomhole pressure lower than pbmin. Figure 2.3 illustrates
the negative effects of accelerated production. The x-axis in both graphs is oil
production, the y-axis in the left one is reservoir pressure, and in the right one
it is gas flared. The red line is when production happened in two steps and the
blue one when it happened in only one step. In both situations oil produced
is the same, but when it happens slower less gas is wasted, and more pressure
remains in the reservoir for next period.
Figure 2.3: Pressure response to accelerated production
Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of pressure and cumulative production
under two policies. The blue line describes the policy of inducing a bottomhole
pressure of 1,000 regardless of oil and gas left. The red line describes the policy
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of exerting a bottomhole pressure 200 psi lower than the reservoir pressure.
Note how the first policy yields a higher production first, but depletes pressure
faster, overall recovery after 10 years is higher under the second policy.
Figure 2.4: Policy comparison
Let β be the one-period discount factor. Firms will typically maxi-
mize discounted profits assuming an infinite horizon. Profits at time t will be
πt = (pt − vc)not − FC. Future price is unknown and stochastic, vc, and FC
are constant. Since operators do not take price into account when deciding
extraction rates and vc is constant, I will simplify the utility function by as-
suming that firms maximize discounted oil extraction. To deal with FC, I will
assume that they will only produce above a minimum threshold, which will
be close to 0. Summing everything together, the maximization problem single
operators will solve is:
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c = TI − To− Tg
no = Wαo(Pr − Pb)βo
To
To + Tg
ng = Wαg(Pr − Pb)βg
Tg
To + Tg
To′ = To− no
Tg′ = Tg − ng
Pb ≥ Pbmin
(2.3)
To derive the optimality conditions, it will be easier to rewrite the problem
eliminating pressure and gas production. One way to go about it is by com-
bining oil and gas production to eliminate bottomhole and reservoir pressure.
We can then write gas produced as a function of oil produced:













Now we only need to rewrite the inequality condition without any pressure
term. Let













then note that the following inequalities are equivalent.





The simplified optimization problem is:




To′ = To− n
Tg′ = Tg −G(n, To, Tg)




Note that when the inequality condition holds with equality, the solu-
tion of the system is trivial. Solving the strict inequality case, we will produce




(1−GTg(t+ 2))Gn(t+ 1)−Gn(t+ 2)−GTo(t+ 2)
(1−GTg(t+ 1))Gn(t)−GTo(t+ 1)−Gn(t+ 1)
To′ = To− n
Tg′ = Tg −G(t),
(2.8)
whereG(t) = G(n, To, Tg), G(t+1) = G(n′(To, Tg), T o′(To, Tg), T g′(To, Tg)),
and G(t+ 2) = G(n′(To′, T g′), T o′(To′, T g′), T g′(To′, T g′)),
Now suppose that there are N firms, each endowed with ni wells. The
first period firms will vote for, or against unitization. If the number of firms
that want to unitize is greater than a certain percentage6, the state will enforce
unitization and a single operator will exploit the reservoir. Profits will be
shared according to size, and the proxy for size we are currently using is
endowment of wells7. The single operator will solve problem 2.3, with W =
6That percentage depends on the state. For Texas it would be 100%.
7Libecap proved that contracts contingent on the number of wells lead to overproduction
Libecap, 1984. That critic does not apply here because number of wells is given.
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∑
Wi. If they are not unitized, each period firms will simultaneously induce






noi respectively. Since reservoir pressure
is a decreasing function of the oil and gas left, accelerated production will also
reduce it.
The simplified version of the problem firms solve under competition is
very similar to 2.7. Let ni(To, Tg, n−i) be the oil player i produces given To,
Tg, and other player’s strategies n−i. Given n
∗
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Tg′ = Tg −G(ni, T o, Tg)−
∑
j 6=i
G(n∗j , T o, Tg)




The first intertemporal condition of this problem will be exactly the same as
the one in 2.8. The second and the third differ in an obvious way, making
it easy to identify the common pool externality. In this case, deriving the
dynamics of the model based on the optimality conditions is very complicated,
and maybe even impossible. A better way to further explore the model will
be to simulate solutions using different sets of parameters.
8Note that the equilibrium condition is already defined in the problem since the value
function is valuated at n∗−i
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2.5 Simulation
The main objective of this model is to find out how oil recovery and
profits will increase by unitizing tracts given reservoir characteristics and the
composition of firms (size and number) with interests a common field. I also
want to assess when firms achieve unitization by private contracting (unani-
mously) and when they need some help from legislators. Remember that the
characteristics of a reservoir that will influence its dynamics are permeability,
viscosity and amount of hydrocarbons, and that the βis and αis are the viscos-
ity and permeability, respectively. In this section I will show how unitization
influences outputs and dynamics for different sets of parameters. I will also
show when unitization will be achieved privately.
To simulate different instances, I solved the program using the value
function iteration algorithm. The value function, as well as its two variables,
were discretized using a 100-point grid. The decision variable is bottomhole
pressure, and it was discretized using 1,000 values. For each instance, the
algorithm takes around 20 minutes to converge, so the grid could easily be
extended and converge in a reasonable time. Moreover, simulating assuming
number of wells is endogenous could also be achieved in a reasonable time by
paralleling the algorithm.
The algorithm was run several times for different sets of parameters, al-
though only three combinations that yield important insights will be presented
here. See parameters used in table 2.1. For each combination, I computed the
value function and dynamics under unitization, and under two different not
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unitized cases.
Table 2.1: Simulation Parameters
Combination 1 Combination 2 Combination 3
To 1, 000, 000 1, 000, 000 100, 000, 000
Tg 10, 000, 000 5, 000, 000 0
αo 2 1 1
αg 0.5 1 1
βo 1 1 1
βg 1.8 1.5 1.5
W 6 10 6
a 0.9 0.2 0.2
One where both firms have the same number of wells, and the other
where firm 2 has 1 well and firm 1 the rest. For example, combination 1
represents a reservoir with 6 wells. Under the unitized scheme a single operator
manages them all. Under the symmetric case, each firm has 3 wells. Under the
asymmetric case firm 1 has 5 wells and firm 2 has 1 well. There were always
only two firms.
First focus on combination 1 and combination 2. The proportion of gas
to oil, the viscosity difference (βs) between substances, and rock permeability
are higher in combination 1 compared to those in combination 2. Moreover,
in the asymmetric case in combination 2, firm 2 controls basically all the
reservoir. Considering all this, we would expect that unitizing will increase
overall value more in combination 1 than in combination 2. When comparing
results between the same combination, we expect that unitization has a bigger
impact in the symmetric case. The reason is that in the asymmetric case the
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most influential firm will control a greater part of the reservoir. It is in its best
interest to act preserve pressure. Finally, we expect that private contracts will
more likely be reached in the symmetric case than in the asymmetric case,
otherwise we would be contradicting all previous literature. Combination 3,
the naive one, explores what happens when there is no gas in the reservoir.
Since depletion of gas is the mechanism that causes waste, we expect to always
get the same results.
Simulation results are shown in figure 2.5. The table at the top sum-
marizes how value function behaves under the scenarios studied. As expected,
the difference in combination 1 is greater than the difference in combination
2, the differences are 26% and 5% respectively. Moreover for both combina-
tions the increase in value due to unitization is greater under the symmetric
case. Finally, symmetric firms unanimously decide to unitize, whereas only
big firms in the asymmetric case vote for it. Here is where legislation be-
comes relevant. North Dakota Industrial Commission would make them work
as a unit, the Texas Railroad Commission would not. The graphs below show
how the dynamics of oil production, oil trap, pressure induced, and reservoir
pressure differ. The left-most graphs compare unitization to the symmetric
case, the middle ones compare unitization to the asymmetric case and the
right-most ones compare results between unitized, symmetric and asymmetric
cases. Note how under unitization (blue thick lines) overall production is lower
at the beginning and higher later on. Overall recovery after 10 years is higher,
and pressure depletion lower.
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Figure 2.5: Simulation Results
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2.6 Conclusion
The common pool externality has intrigued many economists since
Hardin’s seminal paper in 1968. Many scholars have contributed to the lit-
erature by studying different industries. Sharing an oil reservoir is a typical
example, and currently an important one. Private contracting has proven to
be difficult to achieve, and most states have reacted by making it compulsory.
Enforced unitization is currently a controversial topic in the Texas House of
Representatives.
Most scholars that study unitization as a solution of the common pool
externality in the oil industry focus on explaining why private contracting
fails, and assume it will always improve outcomes. A few have tried to doc-
ument how such outcome has improved in the past. The model in this paper
achieves both things simultaneously. It quantifies the potential gains in value
and recovery, while predicting if private contracting will be successful. More-
over, it achieves it by incorporating the mechanics that relate overproduction
with reduced recovery: the presence of another substance. The simulations in
the paper clearly show how different characteristics of a reservoir, and firms
composition -number and size- will affect the likelihood to achieve private
contracting, value of tracts, and overall oil recovery.
One of the main contributions of this paper is its potential for fur-
ther research. Rust motivates his seminal paper using a single agent dynamic
model rust Then he argues that to match reality, a structural stochastic error
is needed. That said, an interesting line of research would be to introduce
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a structural error to the model that represents what firms know about the
reservoir that econometricians do not, and use the widely available data to es-
timate the parameters in the model. On a second, and fundamentally different
approach, researchers could use a reservoir simulator to predict recovery of oil
in a reservoir optimized as a whole (unitized) and how it will differ if it was
optimized by parts (not unitized). Comparing the results obtained using these
two approaches will yield another example of how well the structural models
used in economics perform when econometricians do not observe all the data.
Throughout the paper, I emphasize that overproducing diminishes re-
covery because more gas is wasted. When capturing that gas is not econom-
ically convenient it is flared. Recently, some states passed stringent laws to
reduce flares, and there have been some signs that this is reducing production
(Seeley, 2014). Up to now, the effects this new legislation seem to go on the
same direction that unitizing tracts. There are several interesting questions
surrounding these facts, for example: are unitized firms being less affected
than the others? how will small firms that typically overproduce react? do
we expect to see more units formed voluntarily? can these rules substitute
compulsory unitization?
Finally, it is well documented that in the fishery industry partial uni-
tization usually worsen overproduction. It is not obvious that the same will
happen in the oil industry. As far as I know, there is no research on that. The
model in this paper shows that the outcome is better when there is a small
firm and a big firm than when there are two middle-size firms sharing a pool.
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This might suggest that partial unititization might also make things worse in
the oil and gas industry.
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Chapter 3
A reduced-form approach to study well
productivity changes under compulsory
unitization
3.1 Introduction
A way to deal with the common pool externality that happens when
several firms try to extract hydrocarbons from the same field is to assign a
single operator to exploit each field. Every major state regulatory agency
allows such contracts as long as every firm involved agree, such contracts are
known voluntary unitization. Since legislators have not observed as many
unitization contracts as they expected given the efficiency gains, they came
up with a stronger version in which they can force firms to join units if there
is enough consensus amonth the operators in a field that a single operator
would improve efficiency and profits. By now, every major producing state,
but Texas, has a form of compulsory unitization in its legislation.
In this paper, I will take advantage of the fact that New Mexico and
Texas have different compulsory unitization policies to measure the that having
compulsory unitization has in well productivity. As explained before, Texas
does not enforce compulsory unitization, while New Mexico does. Also, New
Mexico and Texas have a large border and there are important reservoirs, e.g.
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the Permian Basin, which encompasse area in both states. Moreover, New
Mexico passed compulsory unitization in 1977, this gives enough time to an-
alyze how the policy affected efficiency in production. I have oil production
data and location of wells from 1970 onward. I use the policy change in New
Mexico to adjust a difference in difference design (DID) to analyze how com-
pulsory unitization affected efficiency. Moreover, I use the fields in the border
to also analyze the problem from a regression discontinuity (RD) perspective.
The RD results suggest that in New Mexico production throughout the
life of a well is between 2,239 and 2,664 barrels higher than in Texas. There
seems to be no significant differences in other variables such as depth of wells,
elevation, location of wells, and drilling year. The DID estimation suggests
that compulsory unitization increased the efficiency of wells in between 2,551
and 3,872 barrels. The robustness results suggest that there were not signifi-
cant differences in trends before treatment.
Libecap, 1984 surveyed three contractual solutions to the CPE that
firms and legislators tried during the 20th century. Their paper shows that
unitization is most efficient solution, but is not as used as one would expect.
Following up on this insight, Libecap, 1985c argue that a potential resason
for failing to form units is private information. Importantly, Libecap, 1985a
conclude that compulsory unitization was approved first in states where small
firms are not very influential. Suggesting that the lobby of small firms prevents
the TRRC to implement compulsory unitization. More recently, Balthrop,
2016 proposed a difference in difference approach contrasting Oklahoma and
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Texas to conclude that wells in Oklahoma are more productive than wells in
Texas due to the fact that there is compulsory unitization in Oklahoma. My
paper directly builds on Balthrop, 2016 in two ways. First, it also fits an RD
design, but applies it to a different state corroborating their results. Second,
my paper further isolates the effect of compulsory unitization by leveraging
from the fact that I have data before and after the policy change so I can also
implement a DID approach.
In the next section of the paper, I will give the necessary institutional
details to understand the research strategy and the results. In section 3, I will
describe the data sources and show the summary statistics of the main vari-
ables analyzed throughout the paper. In section 4, I will review the research
strategy. Section 5 shows the result, and a brief discussion of them. Finally,
in section 6 I will conclude.
3.2 Background
When several operators exploit the same oil field they are entitled to
the same hydrocarbons and the same pressure that helps pushing those hydro-
carbons up to the ground. The rule of capture in the United States dictates
that whoever extract the hydrocarbons first is entitled to keep them without
any liability, regardless of where they were originally found. Oil and gas are
fluids, and they will travel underneath the land to wherever there is less pres-
sure, for example an oil well. These facts combined incentivize firms to extract
oil faster than they would do otherwise in order to capture its neighbor oil.
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Figure 3.1: Common Pool Externality
Figure 3.1 illustrates the situation.
A way to mitigate the negative effect of the common pool externality
(CPE) is to assign a single operator to exploit the entire field. Every state
regulatory agency in the United States offers a legal mechanism that allows
firms to assign a single operator called voluntary unitization. Every voluntary
unitization agreement needs to specify three things: who will be the single
operator; what is the area being unitized; and how firms will share profits.
Moreover, to approve units, most regulators impose two conditions: the first
is that the way in which firms share profits must be fair; and the second is
that fields seeking unitization must be reasonably developed.
History has shown that we do not see units formed voluntarily as often
as one would expect given the efficiency gains. By 1947, only 12 of the 3,000
fields in the United states were fully unitized (Libecap, 1984). Researchers
have attributed this failure in unitization to several reasons. For example,
Libecap, 1984 claim that contracts typically failed because parties needed to
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agree on the value of different tracts beforehand. On a different paper Libecap,
1985c argue that private contracting is usually not possible due to heteroge-
neous information. Weaver, 2011 argues that there are several reasons why
this is the case: difficulty in agreeing on how to share profits; firms holding
out for more favorable bargaining powers; lack of reservoir data that reduces
uncertainty; there will be a change in the time pattern of production; produc-
ers value ownership and control; and mistrust on the capacity to exploit the
tract efficiently by another party.
Regardless of the reason why voluntary unitization has failed in the
past, this failure in private contracting has encouraged regulators to incorpo-
rate compulsory unitization to their efficiency-enhancement-kit. Under com-
pulsory unitization, regulating agencies can force firms that do not want to
join a unit to join. The extra condition agencies put to compulsory unitization
is that there needs to be enough consensus among firms that will potentially
join the unit that achieving such unit will result in more efficient operations.
Every state that allows compulsory unitization puts that minimum threshold
in consensus as a percentage of the field area. For example, assume a state
with a minimum threshold of 70% and a field with three firms, such that firm
one has 60% of the area of the field, and the other two firms have 20% each.
If firm one wants to form a unit and any other of the two firms also wants,
then they would reach an agreement of 80%, and they can ask the regulator
of such state to make the other firm join the unit.
As stated in the introduction, the objective of this paper is to measure
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Figure 3.2: Texas - New Mexico border
Source: picture from DrillingInfo (http://info.drillinginfo.com),
January 16, 2017.
how having compulsory unitization in a state can increase efficiency. New
Mexico and Texas offer a good natural experiment to answer this research
question. The states share a border which is around 540 miles long. In terms
of oil production, New Mexico is the 5th biggest state and Texas is the biggest.
The area in both sides of the border has been heavily exploited. Figure 3.2
shows the drilling activity in a section of the border.
In terms of policy, the main difference between Texas and New Mexico
is that in New Mexico there is compulsory unitization since 1977 (NMAC
§70.2.17), but not in Texas. Balthrop, 2016 analyzes the differences in oil
conservation policy between Texas and Oklahoma. They focus on differences
between well spacing restrictions, production quotas, severance taxes, and
compulsory unitization. I will follow the same approach to conclude that for
the most part, policy in Texas and New Mexico is quite similar, and the main
difference is that there is compulsory unitization in New Mexico, but not in
Texas.
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Starting with spacing legislation, New Mexico and Texas ask firms to
have at least 40 acres of land leased in order to drill an oil well. Moreover, Ok-
lahoma and New Mexico state that firms cannot drill wells within 330 feet from
a property line, whereas Texas asks for 467 feet. Although the Texas legisla-
tion seems to be more restrictive, I will follow Balthrop, 2016 and argue that
fields and leases close to the border tend to be big so this will not be a prob-
lem when implementing the regression discontinuity approach. With respect
to production quotas both states establish production allowances that vary
with depth of wells and acres leased. Wallace, 2011 presents the allowances
for Texas. The New Mexico ones can be found in (NMAC §19.15.20). Both
schedules are quit similar, for example, in New Mexico a 40 acre lease with
a 5,000 feet deep well would allow a firm to extract 107 barrels of oil a day,
and in Texas 102. Finally, in terms of production tax, according to Clifford,
2008, the average production tax paid in Texas is 6.5% and in New Mexico
it is 7.5%. In terms of compulsory unitization, Texas only allows unitization
when everyone in the unit agreed to join. New Mexico can force firms to join
a unit. It states that the minimum threshold of agreement is 75%.
3.3 Data
All the data for the analysis was provided by DrillingInfo1 (DI). DI
compiles several attributes of every well and lease in most of the states in the
United States. DI organizes the data by state in several tables, all the data
1http://info.drillinginfo.com/
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for this paper comes from the production tables of Texas and New Mexico.
For Texas, DI has production data since 1934, and for New Mexico since 1970.
The TRRC collects production data at lease level, and the DI data comes from
the TRRC. The Oil Conservation Division in New Mexico collects production
at well level. To make production in both states comparable, I will follow the
approach used by (diddude) and assume that every well in a lease in Texas
produce the same amount of oil.
The main variable I use throughout my analysis is cumulative produc-
tion of oil by lease/well. I am also analyzing production during the first 6
months and during the first 5 years. DI also provides the latitude and lon-
gitude of each well. This will be especially important when applying RD.
Also, to implement robustness checks, I will analyze some geographical vari-
ables that should not change drastically with policy. These variables are depth
of wells and the elevation of the terrain. Finally, the DI data also contains
drilling dates. I will use this variable to select my sample and perform further
robustness checks.
For the main results of the RD part of the paper, I limited the sample
to wells no more than 10 miles away from the border between Texas and New
Mexico. Also, since compulsory unitization exists in New Mexico since 1977, I
only consider wells that were drill after 1978. For the DID part of the paper, I
consider wells drilled before and after 1977. Since the New Mexico data goes
back to 1970, I study the period 7 years before the policy change and 7 years
after the policy change, from 1970 to 1984.
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Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of the relevant variables in
both states and for different distances from the border between the states.
The leading results of the paper will concern the horizontal segment of the
border, so table 3.1 only considers these wells2. The main conclusions of the
paper will be drawn by comparing the Cumulative Oil variable in the 1 mile
range. Note that the summary statistics suggests that wells in New Mexico
are slightly more productive than wells in Texas. Also note that the year
when these wells were drilled, the depth of the wells and the elevation do not
vary drastically. Interestingly, the relative difference in production was greater
taking only relative production in the first 6 months than taking the overall
cumulative production. This suggests that wells in New Mexico produce at
a much higher rate at the beginning than wells in Texas but that difference
diminishes with time. Anderson, Forthcoming suggests that firms increase or
decrease production by drilling or stop drilling, and not by altering production
from producing wells. So one interpretation we could give to this contrast in
production is that firms in New Mexico only drill wells with bigger paybacks
than those in Texas.
Figure 3.3 shows the average of the cumulative production of wells
drilled each year from 1970 to 1985 by state. The figure is important for the
DID approach. Note how in years previous to the treatment the trend in
production is similar between both states. New Mexico consistently presents
2The summary statistics for the vertical part of the border are in Appendix 2, along with
all the other results that take the vertical segment of the border as reference
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Border 1 mile 5 mile 10 mile
State TX NM TX NM TX NM
Ln 6 Month 6.05 7.19 6.17 7.00 6.24 7.35
6.08 7.51 6.4 7.27 6.39 7.51
1.22 1.5 1.54 1.62 1.4 1.79
Ln 5 Year 8.45 9.06 8.5 8.92 8.56 9.28
8.61 9.46 8.65 9.34 8.84 9.5
0.98 1.5 1.3 1.56 1.29 1.64
LnCummulative 9.29 9.73 9.09 9.48 9.21 9.83
9.5 10.09 9.33 10.04 9.5 10.31
1.08 1.74 1.61 1.92 1.41 1.97
Latitude 31.99 32.01 31.95 32.04 31.88 32.11
31.99 32.01 31.94 32.03 31.87 32.13
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07
Longitude -103.65 -103.63 -103.69 -103.59 -103.64 -103.47
-103.9 -103.85 -103.9 -103.7 -103.55 -103.27
0.38 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.31 0.37
Year First prod 1990 1990 1989 1990 1991 1993
1988 1989 1989 1989 1989 1993
8.6 6.08 8.2 7.05 9.54 6.67
Depth 5213 4824 5094 5427 5546 6656
3800 5087 4000 5170 4870 6100
3424 2783 3711 3119 3001 3759
Elevation 2890 2977 2920 3076 2933 3153
2893 2933 2905 2980 2928 3133
230 173 262 1620 271 1018
Observations 209 198 754 393 2409 1022
For every variable, the first row is the mean, the second the median and the third
the standard deviation. Each column refers to a specific state and only takes wells
within the specified distance from the horizontal part of the border between Texas
and New Mexico.
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative oil production by well in New Mexico and Texas
Notes: The lines represent the average cumulative produc-
tion of each well drilled in a given year in Texas and New
Mexico.
a higher average than Texas, but the gap widens after 1977. The trends are
still similar after the treatment year, but the gap is larger. This suggests that
applying a difference in difference approach to this data is valid3.
Finally, figure 3.4 shows a linear trend of the value of different variables
in wells drilled close to the horizontal segment of the border between Texas
and New Mexico after 1978. Note that the axes of the graphs are not exactly
the same in every graph. The domain of each plot was chosen to optimize
the similitude in linear trend in each side of the border. Note that for both
variables that represent production the graphs suggest that there will be an
increase when crossing the border. We do not see a significant difference in
3The same graph for 6 month and 5 year production is can be found in the appendix.
47
the value of the rest of the variables4.
To summarize, in this section I described the main variables and data
sources that will be analyzed throughout the paper. I then presented the
summary statistics for those variables in both sides of the border. The last
part of the section shows figures that suggest that applying DID and RD in
this scenario is valid.
3.4 Research Strategy
Ideally, to estimate the effect of having compulsory unitization on the
efficiency in production of oil, one would run a randomized experiment in
which some fields are subject to compulsory unitization but others are not.
Unfortunately, it is not feasible to implement such experiment. Other two
options a researcher would have are: estimating a structural model and find the
respective counterfactuals; or relay on reduced-form techniques to estimate the
average effect of having compulsory unitization. As stated in the introduction,
chapter four will deal with the structural model. In this chapter, I will leverage
from the data described and the policy change in New Mexico to estimate
the treatment effect using regression discontinuity and difference in difference
techniques.
4I show the same graph for the vertical segment of the border in Appendix 2. Note that
the pictures in Appendix 2 suggest that the assumptions for the DID approach apply better
for the horizontal segment of the border.
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Figure 3.4: Discontinuity across horizontal border
Notes: The line represents the linear trend of each variable before and after the
32◦ latitude line, which delimits Texas and New Mexico.
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Figure 3.5: New Mexico-Texas border
Source: Energy Information Administration
2014 at https://www.eia.gov
3.4.1 Regression Discontinuity
To implement the regression discontinuity approach, I will leverage from
the fact that within 10 miles along the Texas and New Mexico border there
are 191 fields and 3492 wells 5. Moreover, the geography of the fields close to
the political borders do not change by much, as seen in figure 3.4. For all the
regression discontinuity results I will focus on the horizontal segment of the
border, the reason is that similar figures for the vertical segment suggest that
the identifying assumptions of RD apply better when we take this part of the
border as reference. 6 Figure 3.5 shows a map of Texas and New Mexico, such
map shows the vertical and horizontal part of the border. It also shows the
counties close to the border in both states where drilling is popular.
The identifying assumption of my RD regressions is that if policy was
5Along the vertical segment of the border there are 339 fields and 9465 wells
6See Appendix 2 for all the results applied to the vertical segment of the border.
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the same in both states, then the productivity of wells on both sides of the bor-
der would depend linearly on the distance from the border. The RD approach
will give the local effect in well productivity caused by state policy (not just
compulsory unitization) between Texas and New Mexico. In the next subsec-
tion, I complement this approach with DID to isolate the effect of compulsory
unitization.
Let yisft be the oil produced by well i, in state s ∈ {T,N}, by field f at




0 latitude ≤ 32◦
1 latitude > 32◦
(3.1)
Let the baseline regression discontinuity model be:
yisft = αf + γt + β ∗ (latisft − 32) + τ ∗Disft + εisft. (3.2)
The model defined by 3.2 and 3.1 is specific for the horizontal segment of the
border. 7 Under the identifying assumption, τ is the local average treatment
effect of the New Mexico policy compared to Texas.
To increase the robustness of the results, I also estimated the regression
discontinuity model assuming that production is a polynomial function of lat.
In the Results section I present the results for polynomials up to order 4, I
ran the regressions for higher orders but the average treatment effects did not
7For the vertical segment of the model, substitute lat for long in equation 3.2, and instead
of 32, plug -103.06 ins equation 3.1.
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change. As an example, equation 3.3 shows the third order specification of the
model.
yisft = αf + γt + β1 ∗ (latif − 32) + β2 ∗ (latif − 32)2
+ β3 ∗ (latif − 32)3 + τ ∗Disft + εisft.
(3.3)
For RD models, one needs to specify bandwidth around the threshold
that defines treatment and control groups that defines which observations will
be considered. To increase robustness, it is common to try different band-
widths. The results I will present in the next section are considering a radio
of 1 mile, and 5 miles around the horizontal segment of the border 8.
Also, as further robustness checks, I also ran 3.2 with different depen-
dent variables that I would not expect to change at the border. Such variables
are longitude, depth of the reservoir, terrain elevation and year when the wells
were drilled. The identifying assumption of my analysis suggests that the
geological borders are not the same as the political borders. Running the re-
gressions on depth and elevation help to test the identifying assumption. The
fact that longitude does not drastically change at the border means that the
wells are actually in the same field. The years when the wells were drilled could
change as an effect of the policy, but as will be seen in the results section, there
does not seem to be an effect.
To summarize, the first approach in this paper I implement to answer
my research question is RD on cumulative production of oil throughout the life
8Results for 10 miles are presented in Appendix 2.
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of wells. To prove that my results are robust, I first use different bandwidths,
and polynomial orders. Finally I prove that there no effect in geological vari-
ables9.
3.4.2 Difference in Difference
The RD design helps to quantify the effect of the New Mexico policy
compared to the Texas policy. As shown in the Background section, the main
difference is that there is compulsory unitization in New Mexico but not in
Texas. Nevertheless, this approach does not rule out the contribution of other
differences in policy. Also, there are other intangibles, for example, it might
be cheaper and faster to do the paper work to drill a well in one state than the
other. A way to overcome this is to estimate a DID model. To achieve it, I
leveraged from having data before and after 1977, the date when New Mexico
incorporated compulsory unitization in its legislation. Another advantage of
DID is that the results will be generalizable to all Texas and not just to the
border.
The identification assumption I rely on is that if New Mexico would
have not passed compulsory unitization, then the production trend after 1977
would have been the same as before. Figure 3.3 suggests that the trends in
productivity of wells before 1977 were similar in both states. After 1977 there
is a jump in productivity of New Mexico wells, the identifying assumption
9Everything is applied to the horizontal segment of the border, the results for the vertical
part are in Appendix 2.
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implies that without the change in regulation we would not be able to see such
jump.
Let yitfs be the cumulative production of well i at field f in state s at
time t. The baseline DID model in the paper is:
yitfs = αf + γt + ρIt>1977 + σIs=NM + τIt>1977 ∗ Is=NM + βXitfs + εitfs, (3.4)
where αf if a field fixed effect, γt is a time fixed effect, It>1977 is an indicator
that the year is after 1977, and Is=NM indicates that well i was drilled in New
Mexico, and Xitf is a vector of observables (latitude, longitude, depth and ele-
vation). The coefficient of interest is τ , which under the identifying assumption
measures the effect of having compulsory unitization in New Mexico.
I estimated the base model as presented in equation 3.4. To check
robustness I also estimated 4 different specifications of the model: two without
year fixed effects, but one of them with year as control; one without and Xitf
control and the other without latitude and longitude as controls. Also, in
Appendix 2 I present results changing the dependent variable to production
during the first 5 years instead of overall production.
To check the assumption that trends before 1977 are similar between
wells in Texas and wells in New Mexico, I also estimated model 3.5
yitfs = αf + σIs=NM + γ ∗ t+ τ ∗ t ∗ Isi=NM + βXitf + εitf , (3.5)
I ran two versions of model 3.5, in the first, I restrict the difference in
trend between New Mexico and Texas to be linear. In the second model, I
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assign a dummy to each year. Ideally, both models will suggest that the trends
before 1977 are not significantly different.
In summary, to complement the results obtained by RD, I estimated a
DID model. In the results section, I will present several specifications of the
model. Also, to prove the that the difference in difference approach is valid, I
estimated the difference in trend before the policy change.
3.5 Estimation Results
This section presents the main results of the paper. On the first sub-
section, I analyze the regression discontinuity results, and the second is about
difference in difference.
3.5.1 Regression Discontinuity
The main RD results can be found in table 3.2 and table 3.3. Each row-
column combination in each table represent the τ parameter of an individual
regression discontinuity design. Rows represent different dependent variables,
and columns polynomial orders, as labeled in the table. The results in table
3.2 are computed with a bandwidth of 1 mile around the horizontal border
and table 3.3 assumes a border of 5 miles.
Table 3.2 suggests that production by well in New Mexico is higher
than in Texas. Table 3.1 suggests that on average wells in New Mexico drilled
at most a mile from the border with Texas produce 10,829 barrels of oil. So the
first row in table implies that the increase in production attributable to New
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Table 3.2: Regression Discontinuity, horizontal border, 1 mile band-
width
Polynomial Order 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable
log cum oil 0.188* 0.199* 0.196* 0.202*
(0.138) (0.141) (0.14) (0.14)
log 6 month oil 0.339* 0.405* 0.402* 0.404*
(0.251) (0.252) (0.252) (0.252)
log 60 month oil 0.27 0.284 0.285 0.29
(0.252) (0.253) (0.252) (0.252)
depth -372.664 -255.549 -264.292 -261.403
(1137.46) (1031.93) (1039.56) (1039.4)
elevation 46.741 38.544 37.178 36.982
(40.933) (42.169) (42.249) (42.315)
longitude 0.185 0.16 0.16 0.159
(0.248) (0.219) (0.219) (0.219)
drilling year 0.083 -0.051 -0.044 0.014
(1.397) (1.409) (1.41) (1.404)
Each pair of estimate/standard error represents the average treatment
effect estimated with a different regression discontinuity design. Rows
indicate different dependent variables, and columns are different polyno-
mial orders. Wells in New Mexico and Texas drilled after 1778. Treatment
means that the well is in New Mexico, control wells are located in Texas.
Standard errors are clustered at field level. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, *
p ≤ 0.1
56
Mexico policy is between 2,239 and 2,664. The results in the second column
are also statistically significant. They imply that 6 months after production
started, the amount of oil by well extracted in New Mexico is between 518 and
652 barrels higher.
Depth, elevation, longitude are robustness checks. Since these variables
depend on the geology and not on policy, I do not expect a significant change
at the state line. As can be seen in table 3.2, for the 1 mile bandwidth we do
not find any significant difference. This happens regardless of the order of the
polynomial applied to the latitude variable.
Similarly, table 3.3 shows the results assuming a 5 mile bandwidth
around the horizontal segment of the border. The results in the table suggest
that during their lifetime, well in New Mexico are more productive than wells
in Texas by between 3,497 and 3,633 barrels of oil. So this table suggests
results that are substantially higher than when considering a bandwidth of
just one mile.
In any RD design, there will be a trade off when deciding the bandwidth
between the number of observations and the validity of the identification. Ta-
ble 3.1 shows that if limiting the bandwidth to 1 mile around the border, we
are left with more than 400 wells in the sample. They are enough observa-
tions apply regression discontinuity. Moreover, the 1-mile specification does
not violate any robustness check. In Balthrop, 2016, they conclude that Okla-
homa wells are more productive than Texas wells, in 3,361 in the life of a well.
This results in is closer the 5-mile specification. Nevertheless, the minimum
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Table 3.3: Regression Discontinuity, horizontal border, 5 mile band-
width
Polynomial Order 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable
log cum oil 0.311*** 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.305***
(0.126) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129)
log 6 month oil 0.76*** 0.675*** 0.674*** 0.675***
(0.121) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
log 60 month oil 0.351*** 0.256** 0.256** 0.256**
(0.115) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
depth 856.958 253.2 256.319 259.644
(1218.05) (929.12) (929.134) (929.347)
elevation 108.167** 64.038 64.203 64.311
(48.753) (50.993) (50.974) (50.956)
longitude 0.169 0.097 0.098 0.098
(0.227) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203)
drilling year 2.005*** 0.197 0.208 0.219
(0.693) (0.697) (0.697) (0.696)
Each pair of estimate/standard error represents the average treatment
effect estimated with a different regression discontinuity design. Rows in-
dicate different dependent variables, and columns are different polynomial
orders. Wells in New Mexico and Texas drilled after 1778. Treatment
means that the well is in New Mexico, control wells are located in Texas.
Standard errors are clustered at field level. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p
≤ 0.1
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threshold to enforce compulsory unitization in Oklahoma is 66%, and in New
Mexico it is 75%.
Table 3.4 shows the DID results. Every column is a different specifica-
tion. Everyone of them has field fixed-effects. The first column in the table
does not control for anything. The second specification controls for year. The
third has no controls, but it has time fixed effects. The fourth has time fixed
effects, and it controls for latitude and longitude, and the last also controls for
depth and elevation.
The results in table 3.4 suggest that passing compulsory unitization in
New Mexico increased production by well in New Mexico in between 2,551 and
3,872 barrels of oil. These results are similar to the ones obtained by the RD
approach.
Figure 3.3 suggests that the difference in trend in production by well
between Texas and New Mexico before compulsory unitization was passed
by New Mexico not significantly different. Table 3.5 tests for these results.
In the first specification, I am testing for a linear trend. The estimate of
(Treatment = 1)×Year is not significant, which suggests that the linear trend
before unitization is the same. The second specification sets year 1971 as base
and check if there are deviations in the following years and none of the cross
estimates are significant. These results suggest that the difference in difference
specification is valid.
To summarize, in this section I present the estimation results of the
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Table 3.4: Difference in difference, dependent variable log of cumula-
tive oil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State = NM∗ 0.185∗ 0.183∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.266∗
year ≥ 1977 (0.128) (0.128) (0.126) (0.123) (0.173)
year ≥ 1977 -0.0183 0.0764 -0.209 -0.165 -0.251∗
(0.073) (0.093) (0.126) (0.112) (0.127)
State = NM 0.608 0.617 0.548 0.496 -1.590











Constant 8.979∗∗∗ 37.22 9.159∗∗∗ 9.913∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗
(0.147) (19.607) (0.154) (0.320) (0.542)
Time FE X X X
Field FE X X X X X
Observations 121832 121832 121832 117537 76268
The first column is a field fix effects model without controlling for year.
The second column is as the first, but also controls for year. The third,
fourth and fifth models also has time fixed effects. The dependent variable
is log of the first 60 days of production of each well. Standard errors
clustered at the field level reported. Every well in the sample was drilled
in either New Mexico or Texas between 1970 and 1982. *** p ≤ 0.01, **
p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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Table 3.5: Trend before treatment, dependent vari-
able: log of cumulative oil
(1) (2)
Treatment = 1×Year 0.0116
(0.015)














Year=1972 × Treatment=1 -0.0406
(0.089)
Year=1973 × Treatment=1 -0.0111
(0.086)
Year=1974 × Treatment=1 0.183
(0.192)
Year=1975 × Treatment=1 -0.0392
(0.101)





Wells drilled before 1978. Treatment means that the well
is in New Mexico, control wells are located in Texas. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at field level. *** p ≤ 0.01, **
p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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RD and the DID specifications. Using RD and assuming a 1-mile bandwidth,
the results suggests that the New Mexico policy increases efficiency of wells by
between 2,239 and 2,664, using a 5-mile bandwidth, the results are between
3,497 and 3,633. The DID approach suggests that compulsory unitization
contributed in making wells in New Mexico more productive in between 2,551
and 3,872 barrels per well.
3.6 Conclusion
Every mayor oil producing state in the United State, but Texas, has
implemented a form of compulsory unitization into its legislation. In this chap-
ter, I compared Texas and New Mexico to find out how compulsory unitization
affected efficiency in production.
By applying RD, and DID, I find that compulsory unitization did in-
crease efficiency in production of oil. The RD approach suggested that the
increase in efficiency is between 2,239 and 2,664 by well. The DID approach
suggest that the number is between 2,551 and 3,872. The advantage of DID
is that I did not have to limit the conclusions to a neighborhood close to the
border. Moreover, it isolates the effect of compulsory unitization and not of
the overall difference in policy of both states.
The main limitation of the approach implemented in this paper is that it
does not allow to explore a wide range of interesting counterfactuals related to
efficient legislation of oil production. For example, we are not able to explore
how big is the common pool externality created by several firms trying to
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extract oil from the same firm. Moreover, legislators place several restrictions
in voluntary unitization, currently we are not able to predict how efficiency
could improve is they modified voluntary unitization. Finally, we are not
able to see how different implementations of compulsory unitization might




Counterfactual analysis of compulsory
unitization
4.1 Introduction
The exploitation of a single oilfield by several firms is a typical example
of the common pool externality (CPE). Pressure is the natural force that
pushes oil up to the surface when firms are trying to extract it. Increasing the
rate of production makes the pressure in the reservoir fall at a much faster rate,
making it inefficient to extract too fast. Nevertheless, when several firms share
an oilfield, they have incentives to produce faster than they would otherwise.
This happens because the rule of capture in the United States dictates that
regardless of where the hydrocarbons are originally found, whoever extracts
them first is entitled to keep them (Homan, 2011).
If agents facing the CPE assigned a single operator to exploit the whole
resource, then such operator would not face the CPE. In that sense, such
operator would extract the oil efficiently. In the oil business, there is a legal
contract called unitization that allows firms to cooperate in such a way when
exploiting a field. Regulators across the United States impose two restrictions
when firms seek to unitize: first, the field needs to be “reasonably developed”;
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second, the way in which firms share profits must be “fair.” The problem with
the first restriction is that if firms start working separately before unitizing,
so they might start exploiting the field inefficiently. The problem with the
second restriction is that by restricting the profit sharing options, firms might
not reach some unitization agreements they would otherwise.
Libecap, 1998 documented that unitization agreements do not happen
as often as regulators would expect. The failure in private contracting has en-
couraged oil regulating agencies around the United States to incorporate com-
pulsory unitization to their production-efficiency-enhancement toolkit. Under
compulsory unitization, if the number of firms in a field that want to form a
unit exceeds a certain threshold, then the regulator can force the dissidents
to also join the unit. The minimum threshold varies widely in different states
1. Texas is the only major producing state without any form compulsory
unitization.
In this chapter, I analyze the dynamic strategic interaction of firms
competing for common resources. This will enable me to compute the welfare
loss due to the CPE firms face when they share an oilfield. Moreover, I measure
how welfare would change under different regulatory policies. On one hand,
I analyze welfare if the Texas Railroad Commission (TRRC), which is the
agency that regulates the oil industry in Texas, relaxed the restrictions on
voluntary unitization. On the other, I analyze how incorporating different
1For example, Tennessee has a 50%, Kentucky 51%, New York 60%, Ohio 65%, Alabama
66.66%, Mississippi 75%, and North Dakota 50% Kramer, 2007
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versions of compulsory unitization to its legislation would affect the efficiency
of production of oil, as well as the overall outcome.
Huang, 2014 argue that it is paramount to account for the dynamic
interaction of firms when assessing counterfactual regulatory policies in in-
dustries that face the CPE. Following this logic, I model how firms develop
an oilfield and how they form units throughout time. The proposed model
accounts for the restrictions placed by the TRRC on voluntary unitization.
The dynamic nature of the model could be argued in two ways. First, the
CPE happens because excessive production today will deteriorate production
tomorrow. Second, the gains of unitization will vary with the time elapsed
between the discovery of a field and the date of the contract. To estimate
the parameters of the model, I constructed a panel which contains monthly
production, drilling dates and costs, price of oil, and information on every uni-
tization agreement. The estimated model enables me to recover the welfare
loss due to the CPE by re-computing the equilibrium of the model assuming a
single operator exploited efficiently each field. To assess how welfare could im-
prove if the TRRC relaxed the restrictions on voluntary unitization, I modify
the parts of the model that resemble such restrictions. Finally, I change fea-
tures of the coalition formation process to recover what would happen under
compulsory unitization.
I model the development of a field, and the formation of units as a
random stopping game. Firms do not know the stopping time, T , at each
period t < T . At period 0, all firms draw a private and persistent cost of
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joining a unit. Firms will only have to pay that cost if they decide to join
a unit. Each period 0 < t < T , firms will draw, from an i.i.d. distribution,
a private cost of drilling and will decide simultaneously whether to drill a
new production well, an new injection well or do not drill. On top of the
private shock, if a firm decides to drill, it will have to pay an amount common
to all firms, which is a trend in the cost of drilling. Such common cost on
drilling will be modeled with a Markov switching model. At time T , firms
will simultaneously vote for or against unitization. If at least two firms in a
field vote for a unit, a unit that contains every firm that voted yes will be
formed. The continuation values received by each firm will depend on the
voting results. Firms in the unit will share profits in proportion to the area
in the field they have leased2. The fact that profits are shared based on area
resembles the fairness condition placed by the TRRC. Alternatively, I will
relax the area assumption let the firms share profits as a result of a Nash
bargaining game, where the outcome is restricted to a sharing rules that the
TRRC considers “fair.” On the other hand, firms are not certain when the
TRRC will consider a field to be “reasonably developed”. The model captures
this by making T random. I assume that firms solve a Markov Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (MPNE).
I constructed the data used to estimate the parameters of my model
from several sources. I acquired the “Docket” from the TRRC, which contains
2It is important to note that the TRRC allows firms to share profits as a weighted average
of other values the TRRC can also observe. Area is, by far, the most used one.
67
basic information on dates and fields of unitization contracts. I manually
gathered the information on how firms that unitize share profits from the
TRRC hard records. Also, I built a monthly panel containing monthly oil
production and drilling dates by every firm, in every field in Texas. The panel
runs from 1980 to 2008. To estimate the parameters of the model, and compute
the counterfactuals, I will only consider fields discovered in that time span,
with more than one firm and less than five exploiting it. Finally from RigData
3, and the Energy Information Agency4, I recovered trends in cost of drilling
and price of oil.
To estimate the parameters in the data, I follow Ryan, 2012 and use the
methodology proposed in Bajari and Levin, 2007, which I will refer to as BBL
from now on. The BBL algorithm falls into a growing branch of the literature
that estimates dynamic games while overcoming the computational burden
associated with the estimation5. BBL proceeds in two stages. On the first
stage, I recover the choice distribution of drilling and unitization conditional
on observables, and transition probabilities conditional on actions. On the
second stage, I recovered the structural parameters of the distribution of cost
of unitization, and drilling costs. After estimating such parameters, I will use
the model to recover the value that firms that unitized would have created
under the alternative scenario of “have not unitized.” With that, and the data
3https://rigdata.com
4http://www.eia.gov
5Some examples of these procedures were developed in Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007,
Pakes and Berry, 2007, and Pesendorfer, 2008.
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on how those firms shared profits, I will recover the bargaining parameters of
the model.
I use the estimated model to learn what would have happened if each
field was exploited by a single operator. From there, it is straightforward to
recover the loss due to the CPE. In a second stage, I relax the assumptions
on the model that resemble the conditions placed by the TRRC on voluntary
unitization. By doing so and recomputing the equilibrium, I recover how
welfare would change if unitizing voluntarily was easier. In the third stage of
counterfactuals, I assess what would happen under compulsory unitization by
changing the voting mechanism.
The counterfactual analysis suggests that the welfare loss due to the
CPE is actually substantial. Throughout the 30 years of analysis, having a
single operator by field would have increased the oil produced from the 501
fields in the sample in around 70.84M barrels, with a value of $4.28B. Such
increase comes from two sources: an increase in overall production per field,
and the increase in injection wells compared to production wells. Eliminating
the restrictions placed on voluntary unitization would have increase production
in around 55.35M barrels, worth $3.16B. Finally, compulsory unitization
could further improve production in 39.49M barrels, or $2.24B.
This paper relates very closely to four different branches of the eco-
nomics literature. The first is the study of the common pool externality and
possible solutions to it. The second is on modeling coalitions in dynamic
settings. The third is on the growing literature that estimates dynamic pa-
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rameters using two stage methods. Finally, the paper relates to the empirical
papers that use the Nash-in-Nash (NiN) assumption to estimate bargaining
parameters.
Libecap, 1984 surveyed three contractual solutions to the CPE that
firms tried several times during the 20th century. The authors show that
unitization is most efficient solution but quite underused. Following up on this
insight, Libecap, 1985c argue that the problem is private information created
during the exploration period. Importantly, Libecap, 1985a conclude that
compulsory unitization was approved first in states where small firms are not
very influential. Suggesting that the lobby of small firms prevents the TRRC
to allow compulsory unitization. More recently, Balthrop, 2016 proposed a
difference in difference approach contrasting Oklahoma and Texas to conclude
that wells in Oklahoma are more productive due to compulsory unitization.
Similarly, Herrera (2016) compares efficiency in production between Texas and
New Mexico and draws similar conclusions.
Lin, 2013 is the first to study the dynamic strategic interaction of firms
sharing a common resource. She concludes that firms leasing federal tracts in
the Gulf of Mexico consider their neighbor’s actions when taking production
decisions, especially if the leased tracts are small. She is also quantifies the
welfare transfer from the firm that exploits their tract last to those that exploit
it first. Like Hendricks, 1993, she acknowledges unitization in federal tracts
as a solution to the CPE, but it goes beyond the scope of her paper. The two
decisions taken by firms Lin models is when to start exploring and when to
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start producing. The main mechanism of the welfare loss due to the CPE I
will study in this paper is how firms take drilling decisions differently while
exploiting a field and not just at the beginning. That will allow me to measure
the productivity of each well, and how it would be different if there was a
single operator. Moreover, thanks to this approach, I will be able to explore
counterfactuals related to compulsory and voluntary unitization.
My model can be estimated thanks to the recent methodological con-
tributions in estimating dynamic games. Some examples of such algorithms
are Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007, Pakes and Berry, 2007, and Pesendorfer,
2008. Particularly, I use the approach proposed in Bajari and Levin, 2007.
There is a growing literature applying BBL to estimate dynamic models.
The third contribution of this paper is on empirical papers based on
the estimation of Nash-in-Nash (NiN) bargaining. NiN models assume that
when sevaral players participate in a bargaining game, they bilateraly reach
the Rubinstein (1986), assuming the outcome of the other negotiations will also
be such solution. Most of the seminal papers that estimate NiN models are
related to health. Gowrisankaran, 2013 model bargaining between managed
care organizations and hospitals; Grennan, 2013 study hospitals and stent
manufacturers; and Ho, 2014 focus on the interaction between hospitals and
insurers. In the same spirit, in my model there is also a business to business
interaction where there will be bargaining. My main contribution is that in
my situation the bargaining will be between two competitors, instead of a
client-provider relation.
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In section 2, I will review the institutional details to understand the
data and the model. Section 3 will describe the dynamic model. In section
4, I will present data and in section 5 explain in detail how I estimated the
model using the data. In section 6, I will show the estimation results, and in
section 7 the counterfactual analysis. The last section concludes.
4.2 Institutional details
The United States is one of the few countries in the world where hy-
drocarbons are privately owned6. They originally belong to mineral owners,
who in many cases are also land owners. Oil is a fluid, that will travel under-
neath the earth to places with lower pressure; for example, where oil is being
extracted. The rule of capture states that the firm that extracts the hydrocar-
bons first is entitled to keep them without liability, regardless of where they
were originally found7. These factors combined incentivize firms to behave
strategically sometimes at the expense of efficiency. This strategic interac-
tion leads firms to accelerate production to capture other player’s oil, to stop
6For example in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 203 (1900) the court stated:
Hence it is that the legislative power, from the peculiar nature of the right and the objects
upon which it is to be exerted, can be manifested for the purpose of protecting all the
collective owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment, by them,
of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach the like end by preventing waste.
Leaving the precedent for the rest of the states that the oil is privately owned, and owners
have the right to extract it.
7See, for example, Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. 324, 354, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Ex.
Ch. 1843). Although the Acton v. Blundell conflict happened between a cotton mill and
a coal pit competing for water, it set the precedent that draining springs of neighbor lands
results in a loss without legal harm.
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drilling due to rent dispersion, or to drill a greater share of production wells
instead of injections wells.
According the the Energy Information Administration (EIA), on aver-
age oil in the United States has abeen extracted from a depth between 4,000
and 5,000 feet8. Pressure is the natural force that pushes oil up, through the
wellbore, allowing firms to recover it. Usually that pressure is not enough to
deplete a the area surrounding a wells production well. Around 95% of all the
production wells in the United States use pumpjacks to lift the oil (Parshall,
2013). Moreover, it is often necessary to inject pressure to the reservoir so that
the oil moves close to the surrounding area of producing wells. Firms increase
pressure in a reservoir by drilling an injector well and injecting either methane
or water. An extra production well in a reservoir will be a negative externality
to the rest of the firms because it will reduce the pressure in the reservoir,
drilling a new injection well will be a positive externality because it will in-
crease the pressure of the reservoir. When there is only one firm exploiting a
reservoir, such firm will cash the benefits of an extra injection well, but if the
firm is sharing the reservoir, then the rents from that well will disperse among
the neighbors. In the end, firms that share a field will have less incentives to
drill injection wells.
Before extraction oil belong to mineral owners. Mineral owners usually
lease their rights to oil producing firms. Unfortunately, it is usually not the
8https://www.eia.gov, the data displayed by the EIA runs from 1950 to 2008.
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case that the boundaries of mineral ownership coincide with the boundaries of
petroleum reservoirs. These facts are the cause of the CPE when producing
oil, and they create several inefficiencies, such as drilling unnecessary wells.
Legislators in different states have tried to deal with the CPE in several differ-
ent ways. A way to mitigate the common pool externality is to assign a single
operator to exploit the whole resource. Unitization is the joining together of
tracts in order to cooperatively develop all or a large part of an oil reservoir
(Weaver, 2011). This effectively means assigning a single operator to exploit
the common resource. I will call the product of unitization a unit.
The oil industry is very highly regulated and unitization is not an ex-
ception. Even if a unit is formed voluntarily, it needs to comply with certain
restrictions (Kramer, 1986). Every unitization agreement must, at least spec-
ify who will be that single operator and the area being unitized. Once the
unitization agreement is reached, the single operator will continue extracting
and selling the oil. The stakeholders will also need to agree on the percentages
of the profits from future operations each firm will keep.
The way in which firms will share profits is also highly regulated. The
TRRC will only approve a unit if it considers that the profit sharing rule is
fair. In practice, firms use participation rules, which are weights on values the
regulator can observe. Such weights translate into a way to share profits. Table
(4.1) and the subsequent bullets show an example of two participation rules
and their relationship to profits. Shapley, 1953 proved that if a coaliton can
improve welfare, then agents involved will be able to find a Pareto-improving
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Table 4.1: Example: participation rules
Factor Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
Area (A) 50% 25% 25%
Oil remaining (O) 40% 20% 40%
Cumulative production (P) 70% 10% 20%
Wells drilled (W) 58% 21% 21%
Volume (V) 50% 25% 24%
• Example 1
– Rule: (60% A, 10% O, 10% P, 10% W, 10% V)
– Profits: (Firm 1: 52%, Firm 2: 22%, Firm 3: 26%)
• Example 2
– Rule: (100% A, 0% O, 0% P, 0% W, 0% V)
– Profits: (Firm 1: 50%, Firm 2: 25%, Firm 3: 25%)
way to share profits. Imposing restrictions to profit sharing rules can (and will)
prevent some units to be formed. The TRRC also states that if unitization
is to be approved, the field in question must be “reasonably developed”. The
“reasonably developed” condition can also be very restrictive. Apart from
being an ambiguously defined rule, the efficiency gains achieved by having a
single operator in the field will decrease if the field have already been exploited.
As shown in Libecap, 1984, achieving unitization voluntarily has his-
torically been hard. As a solution to this, every major production state, but
Texas, has incorporated a version of compulsory unitization to its legislation.
With compulsory unitization, if an important portion of the firms in the field
want to unitize they can ask the legislator to force the others to join the unit.
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Figure 4.1: Example
Figure 4.1 shows an example of how compulsory unitization can be petitioned.
In the example, firm 1 has 50% of the area in the field and it wants to form a
unit with firm 2 and firm 3 to exploit the whole field. Firms 2 wants to join
the unit, but firm 3 rather not join. If there is compulsory unitization in this
legislation, firm 1 can approach the regulator to force firm 3 to join the unit.
The main difference in which compulsory unitization is implemented
from one state to another is the minimum threshold in agreement that firms
need to achieve to petition compulsory unitization. For example, Tennessee
has a 50%, Kentucky has a 51%, New York a 60%. Ohio’s minimum consent
level is 65%, while Alabama is 66.66%, Mississippi has 75% and North Dakota
a 50% (Kramer, 1986).
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4.3 Theoretical Model
I model the development of a field and the formation of units as a
random stopping model. The model has three stages. In stage 0, each firm will
draw a private and persistent cost of unitization from a common distribution.
Stage 1 has multiple periods, it models the development of a field by separate
firms before they decide whether to unitize or not. In each period of stage 1
firms will simultaneously make drilling decisions. The last period of stage 1 is
T − 1, since the TRRC is ambiguous with the time when it will allow firms to
unitize, the time when voting for unitization happens, T , will be drawn from a
random distribution where the parameters depend on the actions of the firms.
In stage 2 firms will decide whether to form a unit or not and bargain over
how to share profit. The continuation value firms get at period T depends on
who unitized, how they agree to share profits, and the state of the game at
T − 1.
Firms have rational expectation of when voting for unitization will hap-
pen. This uncertainty models the ambiguity of the “reasonably developed”
condition imposed by the TRRC to firms that want to unitize. Moreover,
since the distribution of T also depends on the actions of the firms, firms can
influence the probability of T by drilling more.
In the following sub-sections, I describe in more detail the different
stages in the model. For every period between 1 and T−1 in stage 1, I untangle
the states, payoffs and transitions. For stage 2, I explain the voting mechanism,
the bargaining protocol, and the continuation values. I then describe the
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equilibrium firms will play.
4.3.1 Stage 0: exploration
There are Nf firms in each field f that will potentially start drilling (or
enter the market) and join a unit. Those Nf firms are the ones that have leased
the mineral rights to extract oil from field f . Each firm i ∈ {1, ..., Nf} will
draw a private and persistent cost of unitization, θif , from the distribution
Gu(θ
U
if ;αu). The cost of unitization can be interpreted as litigation costs,
consulting costs, and it also captures the loss in “learning by doing” of firms
that will not be the main operators, and the fact that they are giving out
control. Such cost will be firm-field specific. Firms will only incur such cost if
they decide to unitize in stage 2. So in the end, the overall cost of unitization
will depend on the number of firms that joined a unit.
The land leased by each firm is taken as given, and will also be revealed
to every firm in stage 0. Each firm i has Ai acres. The relative size of a firm





The relative area will be important because according to the TRRC the way
in which firms share profits must be fair. In stage 2, relative area, as well as
other factors will limit the space of possible sharing rules.
Finally, in stage 0 the characteristics of the field will be revealed to each
firm. Such characteristics will be summarized by the oil transition functions.
These functions describe how much oil a firm can expect to extract by drilling
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an extra well (negative if it is a production well, and positive if it is an injection
well). Also, these functions will quantify the externality caused by other firms
drilling in the same field.
There are no actions, nor payoffs in stage 0. Nevertheless, the outcome
of stage 0 provides a persistent part of the state for the rest of the game. Such





• aif is the relative area of every firm in the field,
• {θUif} is the private and persistent cost of unitization,
• βf are the parameters of the oil transition function in field f .
4.3.2 Stage 1: development
Stage 1 has T − 1 periods in which firms will be developing the field
individually. Each period, each firm will observe a common state and a private
state, and subsequently decide whether to drill an extra production well, an
extra injection well or do nothing. In stage 1, firms do not know the value of
T , but they have rational expectations of it. Also, since the distribution of T
depends on the actions taken by the firms, they are able to influence T . In the




The outcome of stage 0, ΩPi, will be a persistent part of the state
throughout stage 1. At the beginning of each period, t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, all
firms observe a dynamic and public part of the state,
Ωtc = (pt, ct, {W Pift−1,W Iift−1, Oift−1}
Nf
i=1),
where pt is the price of oil, ct is a trend in cost of drilling a new well, W
P
ift−1 is
the cumulative number of production wells drilled up to t− 1 by firm i in field
f , similarly W Iift−1 is the cumulative number of injector wells, and Oift−1 is the
oil produced in period t− 1 by firm i in field f . Moreover, each firm will draw








ift is an heterogeneous part of
the cost a firm would have to pay on top of ct if it drills a new production
well. ξNift is a shock to the fixed cost of firm i in field f at period t if it decides
not to drill. All shocks will be drawn from independent distributions gk where
k ∈ {P, I,N}. Such distributions are common to every firm in every field.
All these components together, define the state each period,
Ωt = {{ΩPi,Ωti}Ni=1,Ωtc}.
Firms deciding whether to drill an extra well mainly care about three
things:
• how production will increase if they drill a new (production or injection)
well,
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• the cost of drilling a new well (trend and shock),
• how the probability of T changes by having an extra well.
Note that the probability of next period being T is not an explicit part of the
state. Nevertheless, it will be a function of the state variables.
4.3.2.2 Actions and payoffs
After observing the state firms decide whether to drill a new production
well, a new injection well or do nothing. Let dkift with k ∈ {P, I} be the decision






There will be a sunk cost associated with drilling a well. If dkift = 1, firm i
in field f has to pay ct + ξ
k
ift. If, on the other hand, d
k
ift = 0 firm i will have
to pay ξDift. ξ
D
ift can be interpreted as the maintenance cost firms have to pay
each period if they do not drill a well.
Firms’ revenues come from selling the oil produced last period at a
price discounted by the variable cost, vc. The variable cost comes from paying
state production taxes, tax, and royalties companies have to pay to mineral
owners, r. So vc = r + tax. So the profits firm i makes form their operations
in field f at time t are:











The three parts of the state will have very particular transitions. The
persistent part of the state, ΩPi, does not change. The shocks {ξPift, ξIift, ξNift}
Nf
i=1
are drawn each period from independent distributions. The common part of
the state will transition according to parametric functions.
The transition of oil production is particularly important, it models the
source of the common pool externality. The oil transition function is broadly
a function of three things: oil production the previous month, new wells, and
wells drilled by others. All that said, the oil transition function is:
Oift =
(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷













dkift−1, βf ) +αif + εift
(4.2)
where:
• Oift: production, dkift with k ∈ {P, I}: drilling indicator, pwift: cumula-
tive wells, , βf : field parameters
• (1) Production from previously drilled wells
• (2) Production from new wells
• (3) Interference factor - decrease in production from competitors drilling
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Element (1) in equation 4.2 reflects a feature commonly observed in oil wells;
since the pressure of the reservoir is decreasing with production, if nothing
changes in a field we would expect production do decrease from one period to
the next (Fetkovich, 1980). Element (2) reflects that new injection and new
production wells will bring in more production to a firm in a field, but the
amount of new production will depend on how many wells have previously
been drilled in the field. Element (3) will capture how a firm’s production
varies whenever some other firm drills a new well.
I follow Kellogg, 2014 in assuming that the price of oil, pt, and cost of
drilling, ct are exogenous. He asserts that this assumption almost certainly
holds institutionally. The argument Kellogg gives is that crude oil is a world
market and the production from Texas wells represented around 3% of global
production. There is a vast literature trying to forecast the price of oil (Perron,
1989, Cabedo, 2003, Yu, 2008). Again, I will follow Kellogg, 2014 and forecast
changes in price and cost as an autorregressive process. The baseline models
of price and cost are:
ln pt+1 = fp(ln pt, γ
p
t , α
p) + εt+1 (4.3)
ln ct+1 = fc(ln ct, γ
c
t , α
c) + εct+1 (4.4)
As stated before, all the shocks are drawn from independent distribu-
tions. The shock on cost of drilling a production and an injector well will be
drawn each period from the distributions GP (θ
P
ift;α









Remember that if a firm drills, it will pay a trend ct, which is common to
everyone and only depends on time and also the shock of drilling, which will
be different for production and injection wells. Usually, well operators sub-
contract service firms to drill wells (Kellogg, 2011). The drilling shocks, that
are unobservable to the econometrician, represent factors such as the specific
agreements reached by a certain firm with the driller, or difficulties particular
the the well in question. With respect to the fixed cost shock, when a well is
drilled production can go for several years with minimum maintenance. The
equipment installed to extract the oil uses natural gas to run. Often, that
natural gas comes as a collateral the the oil produced. The shock in fixed cost
represent the cost of that natural gas, as well as eventual maintenance costs.
The period transition is also quite important. At the beginning of pe-
riod t, firms do not know if T = t+1. Nevertheless, they know the probability








µj = xjβ. (4.6)














Equation 4.6 shows how the probability of T changes depending on the
action of the firm. In the estimation section, I will give a detailed description
84
of the variables that will go into xj. Nevertheless, as figure 4.5 in the data
section suggests, time without drilling and the ratio of production rate in the
current month to previous production will play an important role.
4.3.3 Stage 2
Stage 2 is when firms make unitization decisions. Firms will first decide
whether to join a unit or not. Then, the firms that decided to join the unit
will bargain over how to share the profits of future operations. The payoffs at
period T will depend on the state of the game, the voting results in period T ,
and the bargaining outcome.




0 do not join
1 join
(4.8)
A unit will be formed if more than one firm wants to unitize, or if
∑
i uift > 1.
If that is the case, the continuation value will capture the future profits of the
field assuming the field will be exploited by a consolidated firm and the ones
that did not join. After a unit is formed, the firms that agreed to unitize will
bargain over the future profits of the unit. The bargaining game is described
in the following subsection. Also, every firm that voted to join the unit, will
pay the cost of unitization drawn at the beginning. If a unit is not formed, the
continuation value will be the discounted profits if firms continue developing
the firm assuming there will not be another opportunity to unitize. Although
it is not mandatory by the TRRC that firms can only vote once for unitization,
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of the 89 fields in my sample I only observe 2 where unitization happened more
than once. With respect to failed units at a different moment in time, checking
the TRRC records, I only observed 3 none-successful applications to unitize.
This suggest that in practice, in most fields unitization decisions happen only
once. So the only gains (or loses) firm will generate at time T come from the
unitization cost and the continuation value.
4.3.3.1 Bargaining over unit profits
The share of profits each firm in the unit gets is set in a static bargaining
game that takes place at time T among the firms that expressed interest in
joining a unit. In this bargaining game, each firm negotiates the share of profits
it will keep separately and simultaneously with the biggest firm (in terms of
area leased in a particular field) that will join the unit. The outcome of each
bilateral negotiation will be the bilateral Nash bargaining solution, taking all
other negotiations as given.
As a result of the “fair sharing rule” restriction placed by the TRRC,
firms will bargain over wights in the hyperplane derived from the space of
variables the TRRC can observe. Such variables are number of wells drilled
up to now, W = {Wi}i∈Nf , relative area leased by each firm, a = {ai}i∈Nf ,
oil produced up to now, O = {Oi}i∈Nf , estimate of oil left in the reservoir,
R = {Ri}i∈Nf , and production rate, o = {oi}i∈Nf .
If, for example, we have a field with only two firms and we only focus
on area and cumulative oil produced. Assume that firm 1 has 80% of the area
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leased and has produced 50% of the oil. Let α be the proportion of the profits
firm 1 will keep. The fairness of the sharing rule will imply that α ∈ [0.5, 0.8].




ΠU ∗ αi − Vi




where bi > 0 and b1 > 0 are the bargaining power parameters of firms i and
1. ΠU is the discounted sum of future profits created by the unit. Vi is the
disagreement value firm i would get if a unitization agreement is not achieved.
I am assuming that if firms that want to unitize cannot reach an agreement
on how to share profits, then they will not form a unit at all. Each ecuation is
maximized over αi taking αj∀j 6= i as given the solution to the other problems.
In practice, this assumption means that the biggest firm is negotiating with
each firm separately.
4.3.3.2 Continuation value
The continuation value will come from solving another general equilib-
rium game. The new game will be the same as the one played by firms in
stage 1, but voting for unitization will not happen again.
Assume there were originally Nf firms in field f , and they voted for
unitization at time T . The game played from time T + 1 on will have:
NUf = Nf −
Nf∑
i=1
uift + 1 (4.10)
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firms. Again, each period firms will face a common state, and a private state.
The payoffs for each player will again come from selling the monthly production
of oil. The transitions of price, cost, number of wells, and oil production will
be the same as before. Again, each period firms will draw a shock on cost of
drilling from the same normal distribution.
4.3.4 Equilibrium Concept
In stage 0, firms take no actions. Each period in stage 1, firms will
observe their state and choose whether to drill a production well, an injection
well, or do nothing. In stage 2, firms will observe the final state, and decide
whether to join a unit or not. Firms that join a unit will subsequently bar-
gain over profits. Throughout the game, strategies will only depend on the
current state, in that sense firms solve a Dynamic Markov Equilibrium. That





i) ∈ {0, 1}, σIi (Ωpi,Ωtc,Ωti) ∈ {0, 1}, σU(Ωpi,ΩTc ) ∈ {0, 1},
σa(ΩTc , U) ∈ [0, 1], which are the decision of drilling a production well, drilling
an injection well, unitizing, and bargaining share. Each firm finds such func-
tions to solve two problems in stage 2, and two in stage 1. I will start by
defining the problems firms solve at stage 2 and move backwards.
The two decisions firm i has to take in stage 2 are, whether to join a
unit or not, and what share of the profits they are willing to keep. Starting
by the end, firms interested in joining a unit, will find the strategy, σa(ΩTc , U),
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that solves the bilateral Nash bargaining problem:
σa(ΩTc , U) = argmax
ai
[
ΠU ∗ f(ai, a−i)− Vi
]bi
[




where ΩTc is the final state of the field, and U defines the set of firms that
want to unitize. The solution to all these problems simultaneously would be















Before entering such bargaining game, firms simultaneously decided
whether to join a unit, by finding the strategy σU(Ωpi,Ω
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which could also be characterized with the following Bellman equation:




πift + βEP(t+ 1 = T )V Ui (Ω, {uift}
Nf
i=1)|θiuift





To summarize, the model has three stages. In stage 0, firms will not
take any action, but they will learn what their cost of unitization is and who
they will be sharing their fields with. Each period in stage 2, firms will decide
whether to drill a production well, an injection well or do nothing. Finally,
in stage 3, firms will decide whether to unitize or not, and bargain over the
future profits from the unit.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Data Sources
To estimate the parameters in my model, I used data from four different
sources. The first is DrillingInfo9 (DI), from where I got monthly production
and drilling dates. From the Texas Railroad Commission (TRRC), I have
information on unitization agreements. Finally, from the Energy Information
Administration10, and RigData11, I got information on drilling costs and oil
prices. I am limiting the sample to fields that were discovered between 1980,
and 2000, where drilling stopped before 200812.
Unfortunately, the TRRC does not collect oil production data for each
well separately, instead it gathers production from leases. Several wells can




12The starting date is 1980 because all the area related information I have starts in 1977.
The data quality in the first few years is dubious. The upper bound of the data is to avoid
fields that are currently being exploited.
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owns them and operates them. DrillingInfo gathered data from the TRRC
and consolidated it in several tables. From those tables, I am using monthly
production of oil, drilling date, and the area each firm has leased.
The TRRC also holds oil related information in separte tables in a
database. I acquired their Docket table, which lists every legal case processed
by the TRRC. Every unitization contract needs to be approved by the TRRC,
and therefore will be registered in the Docket. It also contains the date of the
contract, who signed it and the tracts involved. Unfortunately, The Docket
does not contain the participation rules. Nevertheless, the TRRC was very
generous providing access to their physical archives, from where I manually
recovered such participation rules.
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes historic West
Texas Intermediary (WTI) spot prices. Such information can also be found
in several different public sources. EIA also publishes an estimate of the cost
of drilling in different areas in the United States. I also gathered more infor-
mation from the weekly publications of RigData on the daily cost of renting a
drill.
4.4.2 Sample Selection
To estimate the parameters in my model, I will only consider fields that
were discovered between 1980 and 2000. Moreover, the last well in these fields
was drilled before 2008. These restrictions were imposed for two reasons:
the first is that in 2008 fracking became popular and the dynamics of the
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CPE in fracked fields are quite different; the second is to avoid fields that are
currently being developed. Unitization could still help in fracked wells, but the
dynamics would be substantially different. Moreover, the cost of a fracked well
is substantially different to the cost of a well drilled conventionally. A further
restriction is that I am only considering fields where more than 5 wells have
been drilled. The reason to omit these fields is that most of these fields only
have a single operator. In fields with a single operator there is no CPE. Finally,
due to computational limitations, I am omitting fields that were exploited by
more than 4 firms. Table 4.2 shows that by adding this last restriction I only
exclude 18% of the fields and 35% of the oil form the working sample I would
have otherwise.
4.4.3 Data Analysis
This section has two objectives: the first is to provide a general un-
derstanding of the dynamics of how firms develop fields, and the second is to
empirically support, and explain some of the assumptions that I will did while
modeling.
4.4.3.1 General Information
The sample I selected consists of 501 fields. 86 out of the 501 fields have
been unitized. In the 30 years I studied, 9,088 wells have been drilled. Table
4.2 shows more detail in terms of number of firms in each field. There are three
important points to note in this table. The first is that, among this sample
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Table 4.2: Fields by # of firms
Firms Not-Unit Unit % Unit Oil p.f. Oil Oil Dist. Field Dist.
2 203 43 17% 788k 192M 33% 41%
3 115 25 18% 620k 82M 48% 63%
4 97 18 16% 893k 100M 65% 82%
5 56 13 19% 128k 88M 80% 94%
6+ 53 26 33% 153k 116M 100% 100%
Firms: number of firms, Not-Unit: number of fields that never unitized, Unit:
number of fields that unitized at some point, % Unit: percentage of the fields
that unitized, Oil p.f.: production per field (in barrels), Oil: total production from
all fields in that category, Oil Dist.: distribution of total production Field Dist.:
distribution of total number of fields.
of wells, unitization is actually quite important, it happens in over 17% of the
cases. The second point is that the rate of unitization increases substantially
in fields with 6 or more firms. The final point is that I will estimate the
parameters and compute the counterfactuals for 82% of the potential fields in
the sample. Those 82% of the fields produce 65% of the oil.
The following tables and graphs will show systematic differences in
behavior of firms in fields that were eventually unitized to firms in fields that
were never unitized. First of all, in table 4.3 we can observe some of those
difference in several dimensions. Notice how unitized fields tend to be bigger
(in area) than not unitized fields. Since unitized fields are larger, we expect
their production is higher. The interesting part is that the area of unitized
fields is less than 1.5 times the area of non-unitized fields and their production
is around 5 times higher. Also, the productivity of a well in unitized fields
is substantially higher. The two last variables in table 4.3 are the Herfindahl
Hirschman Index with respect to area and original oil in place. They suggest
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Table 4.3: Field Summary Statistics
Variable Unitized Not-Unit
Production 1.10 M 0.26 M
Oil per well 39 k 25 k
Area 1,148 891
HHI Area 0.2 0.12
HHI Oil 0.37 0.32
Production is in barrels of oil, area is
in acres, HHI Area is the Herfindahl
Hirschman index based on area, HHI oil
is the Herfindahl Hirschman index based
on oil production
that when firms leased similar acreage in a field, they are more likely to form
units.
Another pattern that differentiates fields that were eventually unitized
from fields that were never unitized is that, right after discovery, fields that
eventually unitized tend to be exploited at a slower rate than fields that never
unitized. Table 4.4 supports the previous assertion. The data in the table







Read: By month 120, in fields that unitized,
firms have drilled 5.71 times the number of
wells they drilled in the first year. In fields
that did not unitized, only 3.50 times what
they drilled in the first year.
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shows how many wells were drilled after certain years as a factor of the number
of wells drilled during the first year. For example, if in month 24 we observe a
2.0, it means that the wells drilled up to month 24 are twice of those drilled up
to month 12. If in the long run we find factors closer to 1, it means that most
of the wells in such field were drilled during the first year. Notice how, in the
long run fields that were eventually unitized have factors that are substantially
higher.
Figure 4.2 again supports the fact that fields that eventually unitized
were exploited slower. The red dots in the graph show monthly production
of oil in fields that never unitized, and the blue line shows production in
fields that were eventually unitized. The vertical line is the moment when, on
average, unitization happened. All the fields in this sample are roughly the
same size. The figure highlights how fields that were never unitized produce
more oil right after discovery.
Figure 4.3 offers two examples of how fields that eventually achieve
unitization are typically exploited. The blue line in the figures is the overall
production in the field. The green dots are production wells. In these two
examples, drilling happened right after discovery. Suddenly, drilling stopped
and production started decreasing. At that time, the TRRC received a signal
that the field is reasonably developed, and allows firms to unitize. After uni-
tization, the single operator finds it profitable to continue exploiting the field
without facing the CPE.
I mentioned in the Background Section that units are not necessarily
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Figure 4.2: Unitized vs. Not Unitized Fields
Notes: Average monthly production of unitized vs. not uni-
tized fields. Fields of similar size in terms of maximum
production.
Figure 4.3: Evolution of unitized fields
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complete, in the sense that they might not include every firm in the field.
Achieving an incomplete unit potentially diminishes the CPE, but does not
eliminate it completely. Also, compulsory unitization can improve efficiency
by enhancing more units, but also by helping firms achieve bigger units. Table
Table 4.5: % of field unitized
% of Field Unitized # of Fields
0% - 25% 1 1%
25% - 50% 20 23%
50% - 99% 21 24%
100% 45 51%
4.5 shows the relative size of units. The most important takeaway is that in
most cases, units encompass more than 50% of the participants in the fields.
Moreover, around 40% of all the fields in the sample that are unitized are fully
unitized. This suggests that compulsory unitization can improve efficiency not
only in the extensive margin (more units will be formed), in the intensive one
(units will be bigger).
4.4.3.2 Data Backing Assumptions
In the baseline model, I assumed that if unitization happens voluntarily,
firms will choose a participation rule based solely on area. In table 4.6, I sum-
marize how units share profits. Note that area is used by more than 80% of the
units, with a weight of over 70%. Moreover, several of the possible variables
that go into participation rules are highly correlated. The reason is straight
forward: fields with more area will have more wells, it is very likely that they
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Table 4.6: Factors of Participation Rules
Area Original Prod. Rate Remaining Wells Oil
Times positive 84% 10% 21% 18% 24% 36%
Average if positive 71% 42% 46% 44% 18% 36%
Based on the 86 cases of unitization I observed in the fields that were voluntarily
unitized in my sample.
will hold more oil, and they will probably be producing more oil. For those
reasons, the assumption that if a unit were to happen it would be based on per-
centage of area leased could make sense. In the counterfactual analysis, when
I analyze what would happen under different implementations of compulsory
unitization, I will relax this assumption and estimate the bargaining-power of
firms that joined units.
The TRRC allows fields to unitize only if they are “reasonably devel-
oped.” Although the TRRC does not explicitly define what fully developed
means, it is unlikely that it will allow unitization right after discovery. Figure
4.4 shows the Kaplan-Meier Estimate of time to uniization. Notice how the
earliest unitization agreement happened around a year after the field was dis-
covered. Nevertheless, we observe very few unitization agreements between 0
and 5 years after the field was discovered and most happen between 5 and 15
years after discovery.
It is not clear how TRRC decides that a field is “reasonably developed.”
Nevertheless, it is very likely that they consider the drilling and production
activity of the field in their decision rule. I modeled time to unitization using
a Weibull survival model, but letting λ vary with actions taken by the firms.
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Figure 4.4: Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Time to Unitization
Notes: Kaplan-Meier estimate of the time between the dis-
covery of the field and the year when it was unitized.
In figure 4.4 one can observe what happens before unitization. Right after
discovery firms ramp up production by drilling more wells. Before unitization
production decreases, which means that firms stopped drilling. A possible
interpretation is that this sequence of events signals the TRRC that the field
is reasonably developed, and unitization can then be sought. In the estimation
results section I will confirm this observation by fitting a Weibull and a log-
normal model, where the mean of the distributions depend on the action of
the firms. I find that drilling activity in the last year, as well as decrease in
production are good predictors of T .
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Figure 4.5: Monthly Production of Unitized Fields
Notes: Average monthly oil production by field. Only fields
that unitized. Time is normalized, 0 is when the field was
unitized.
4.5 Estimation Strategy
A recent innovation on estimating dynamic models is the development
of two stage algorithms13. Before such innovation, solving dynamic games
was computationally unfeasible most of the times. The burden of one-stage
methodologies comes from the need of finding a fixed point for every combi-
nation of parameters. The backbone of my estimation strategy will be the
methodology developed in Bajari and Levin, 2007. I will refer to such al-
gorithm as BBL. With BBL, I will estimate the transition parameters (first
stage), and the parameters in the distribution of shocks (second state). I
13Some examples of these procedures were developed in Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007,
Hotz, 1994, and Pesendorfer, 2008.
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will then use the estimated parameters, and other equilibrium conditions to
estimate the bargaining parameters. The idea of computing the different ele-
ments of the maximization problem firms solve when bargaining was also used
in Crawford, 2012 and Gowrisankaran, 2013.
The BBL estimator is a two stage one. In the first stage, one finds
reduced form estimates for the state transition functions and choice proba-
bilities conditional on observables (CCP). The second part of the first stage
is to forward simulate value functions assuming that agents behave according
to their CCPs. An innovation of BBL is that it draws random shocks from
the distribution of shocks instead of drawing actions from conditional choice
probabilities.
In the second stage, one exploits the optimality conditions to estimate
the structural parameters. If σ(Ω, ξ) = {σi(Ω, ξi)}Ni=1 are policy functions,
optimality implies that for every strategy σg(Ω, ξ) such that σg(Ω, ξ) 6= σ(Ω, ξ),
then
Vi(s;σi, σ−i, θ) ≥ Vi(s;σgi , σ−i, θ). (4.16)
The idea behind the second stage of BBL is to construct several σgi as slight
alterations to σi and forward simulate the value functions under these policy
functions. Then one optimizes a function over a parameter space that penalizes
whenever equation 4.16 does not hold. If the solution to the optimization
problem is unique, we would say that the parameters are identified.
In the last stage of my estimation, I will recover the bargaining param-
eters. To achieve that, I will use the optimality condition derived from the
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NiN solution. Using data on how firms that unitized shared profits, and by
counterfactually computing the value obtain by those firms if the would have
not unitized (disagreement value), I will have all the components that go into
the NiN optimal conditions. Having all the elements, I am able to recover
the bargaining power of firms. In the rest of this section I will first explain
the details of the first stage of the BBL algorithm, then the second stage, and
finally how I recovered the bargaining parameters.
4.5.1 First Stage
In the first stage of this particular application, I will estimate four state
transition functions and three conditional choice probabilities. The transition
functions are oil production, price of oil, trend in cost of drilling, and the
hazard of T . The CCPs I will need to compute are: drilling a production well,
drilling an injection well, and the decision to join a unit.
4.5.1.1 Transitions
Oil
As mentioned in the model section, the oil transition function is par-
ticularly important because it models the common pool externality of sharing
an oilfield. Thanks to the detailed data I have, I will be able to estimate
a separate oil transition model for each field. These oil transition functions
basically describe how production will evolve depending on drilling decisions
and previous production.
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I modeled the oil transition function in several ways. I tried dynamic
panel data models, in which slopes had a single parameter. The downside
of those models is that, although different fields can have different intersects,
they won’t allow variability in slopes. I also tried dynamic Tobit models, but
faced the same downside. To allow different fields to produce differently, I
modeled each one separately as a linear regression. The model I estimated
using OLS is detailed in equation 4.17. I ran a different regression for every
single field.
Oift = βf + β
O







































• Oift is the oil produced at time t, in field f , by firm i
• dPift ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator of drilling a production well
• dIift ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator of drilling an injection well
• wPift is the cumulative number of production wells drilled by time t
• wIift is the cumulative number of injection wells drilled by time t
One might interpret the parameters as follows: βOf is the percentage of oil
(the reference point is the oil produced last period) that a firm in a field will
extract if nobody else drills in the same field. βPf , β
LP




extra oil a firm in a field will produce if it drills a new production well given
the state of the field. βIf , β
LI
f , and β
CI
f summarize the extra oil a firm would
extract if it drills an injection well in a given state. Finally, βIPf and β
II
f will
be the value of the common pool externality if a different firm in the field drills
a production or an injection well, respectively.
Price and Cost
As mentioned before, I followed Kellogg, 2014 in treating oil prices and
drilling costs as exogenous. All the approaches I used to model the transi-
tion of these variables are variations of autoregressive models. The approach
presented in equations 4.18 and 4.19 are Markov-switching models (MSM), in
which the price of oil can be in a good stage or a bad stage. If the price is in a
good stage, it is expected to increase (or remain the same) in the next period;
if it is in a bad stage, it is expected to decrease. To estimate these models, I
followed the methodology proposed in Hamilton, 1989. I assume two possible






























Ht if st = H.
(4.19)
The state variable sit for i ∈ {P,C} follows the Markov distribution
p(sit = j|sit−1 = k) = pikj. (4.20)
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Hazard of T
The last period of the game is when firms vote for or against unitization.
Every period t firms face a probability that period t+ 1 will be T . I assumed
that such probability follows a Weibull hazard rate given by:
h(t) = pλtp−1, (4.21)
where
λ = γ + γFFf + γA lnAf + γPMOPMOt + γY NDY NDt (4.22)
In equation 4.21, F is the number of firms in field f, Af =
∑NF
i=1Aif is the area








and Y NDt is the time in which there has been no drilling in the field.
The main consequence of the model in equation 4.21 is that firms will
increase the chance of the last period happening sooner if they exploit a field
at the beginning, and then stop drilling for a more than a year. One sensible
explanation to this fact is that this behavior signals the TRRC that the field
is “reasonably developed”, which means that they will approve a unit. The
parameters of the model were estimated via maximum likelihood, for a detail
description see Cleves and Marchenko., 2010. Unfortunately, I cannot observe
if voting for unitization happened in a field, and none units were formed.
So I must relay on the identifying assumptions that the distribution of T is
independent of voting results.
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4.5.1.2 Conditional Choice Probabilities
Conditional Choice of Drilling
Every period, firms will decide simultaneously whether to drill a new
production well, an injection well, or do nothing. I estimated several spec-
ifications using logit and probit models. Specifically, since these are choice
functions conditional on the observable part of the state, the covariates are
functions of state variables. For the second stage, I modeled the choice of
drilling an injection well and a production well with two different probit func-
tions described in equation 4.24 and equation 4.25.
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where pt, ct are price of oil and cost of drilling at time t. Oift and wift are oil
produced and cumulative wells drilled by firm i in field f by time t. WQf , DQf
and IQf are measures of the quality of field. Such measures come from the
coefficients estimated in the oil transition equations. WQf will be a measure
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DQf will be a measure of how new wells from the same firm will perform. The





IQf will be a measure of the externality imposed by other firms when they





I used maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters in the probit function.
I ran the model with all the observations I have of price, cost, and number of
wells from the sample I described in the data section. The quality parameters
came from the oil transition functions.
Unitization policy function
At time T , firms will decide whether they will join a unit or not. Such
decision will also be modeled by a probit function described in equation 4.30.
P (dift = 1) = Φ(α
UnitXUnit). (4.29)
The product αUnitXUnit is given by
αUnitXUnitift = α
W
i WfT + α
WQ
i WQf + α
DQ
i DQf + α
IQ
i IQf + α
N
UNf
+ αMINU MINf + α
MAX
U MAXf + α
RA
U RAfi + α
AW
U AWifT + αU ,
(4.30)
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where Wf is the total number of wells drilled in field f by T , WQf , DQf , and
IQf are as in as in 4.26 to 4.28, Nf is the number of firms in field f , MINf and
MAXf are the minimum and the maximum relative areas a firm has leased in
field f . They are measures of how unevenly distributed a field is. RAif is the
relative area firm i has in field f , and AWif is the acreage per production well
















The results of this conditional choice probability will describe the dependence
of the willingness to unitize on how heterogeneous a field is.
Value function
The goal of obtaining the state transition functions and the conditional
choice probabilities is to be able to forward simulate the value functions. There
are several ways to forward simulate the value functions. The main variation
is whether to draw shocks from the structural error distribution and using
those shocks recover the actions from the conditional choice probabilities, as
in Bajari and Levin, 2007; or to draw actions and recover shocks, as in Ryan,
2012. I followed the approach taken by Bajari and Levin, 2007. The following
lines describe the algorithm I implemented to estimate the value function.
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1. Draw the cost of unitization for each firm ξui , and set the initial state of
the game
s0 = (p0, c0, {W Pift−1 = 0,W Iift−1 = 0, Oift−1 = 0}
Nf
i=1).






i0 ) from N3(0, I) for each firm i.
3. Calculate the action (drill injection and production wells) taken by firms
given the set of shocks, and the inverted policy function: ait = σ̂i(st, xiit),
for each firm i.
4. From the hazard function ĥ(t) draw It, which indicates if the next period
will be the last.
5. Compute the resulting profits, πi(at, xt, xiit; θ).
6. Draw a new state st+1, using the transition probabilities P̂ (st+1|st, at).
7. If It = 1, move on to compute the continuation value, otherwise go back
to step 2.
To compute the continuation value. I follow the same procedure as above
taking the following bullets into consideration:
• If a unit is not formed, the initial values of every firm are the last iteration
of the previous algorithm.
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• The last period is T = 30 years.
4.5.2 Second Stage
The objective of the second stage is to estimate the structural param-
eters of the model. In this case, such parameters are:
• mean and variance of fixed cost, µN , σN
• mean and variance of cost drilling a production well, µP , σP
• mean and variance of cost drilling an injection well, µI , σI
• mean and variance of cost of unitization, µu, σu.
In the second stage, I will take the estimates of the value function from the
first stage. Then, I will slightly perturb the policy functions and with those
perturbations, I will forward simulate new value functions. Finally, I will
find the parameters that optimize a function that penalizes violations of the
optimality conditions.
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The expression of the value function I forward simulated is in equation
4.37. To create the perturbations to the policy functions, I followed Ryan,
2012 and added random draws from N(0, 0.1) to the expressions inside the
normal distribution of the probit conditional choice probabilities.




βtπi(σ̂(Ωt, ξt),Ωt, ξt; θ)|s0 = s; θ
]
(4.37)
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This is important because it will simplify the computation of the search of the
optimal parameters for two reasons. The first is that, as shown in Bajari and
Levin, 2007, the fact that the parameters I estimate appear in the distribution
functions will not cause an extra problem. The second is that Vi(Ω; σ̂; θ) could
be rewritten as
Vi(Ω; σ̂; θ) = W (Ω, σ̂) · θ, (4.39)
where











With this simplification, I will be able to estimate the value function Vi(Ω; σ̂; θ)
for several different sets of parameters, θ, and the same policy function, σ̂ by
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estimating Wi(Ω; σ̂) only once. Without linearity, I would need to estimate a
different Wi(Ω; σ̂) for every variation in parameters.
The equilibrium conditions imply that for any σi 6= σ, then
g(σi, σ, θ) = Vi(s;σi, σ−i, θ)− Vi(s;σgi , σ−i, θ) ≥ 0. (4.41)
Under linearity,











g(σi, σ, θ), 0
]2
∂H(σi) (4.43)
with respect to θ. Note that the expression inside the integral of equation 4.43
will always be greater than 0. The only way it will be 0 is if the optimality
condition holds. So equation 4.43 penalizes every time the optimality does
not hold, and the “right” parameters are those for which optimality fails less.
I minimized the sample analog of equation 4.43 by drawing 1,500 alternative
policy functions. To search for the parameters I used the Metropolis-Hasting
methodology described in Chernozhukov V, 2003.
4.5.3 Bargaining Parameters
To estimate the unobserved bargaining parameters, I will follow the
same framework that Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), and Gowrisankaran, et
al (2015). After recovering all the shock parameters, I compute the counter-
factual of the value firms that unitized would have created if they would have
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not unitized. Equation 4.44, the first order condition of the bargaining game
firms play, shows how I combined sharing rules, firms profits, and the counter-
factual of the future profits firms would have made if the worked separately









In equation4.44 bi, are the bargaining parameters, a
∗
i are the negotiation out-
comes ΠU is the discounted future profits of the unit, and V1 and Vi are the
profits firms would get if they did not reach a unitization agreement. Note
that all the elements in 4.44, but bi, are are either observed in the data, or
can be inferred using the parameters estimated. We observe how firms split
profits in every unit, that gives a∗. V1 and Vi can be computed solving the
equilibrium firms would have achieved without unitization.
4.6 Estimation Results
The estimation results will be presented by parts. I will start with
the state transition probabilities. In the second subsection, I will show the
conditional choice probabilities. In the third subsection, I will display the
parameters of the distribution functions governing the shocks in cost of drilling
and unitization. In a final subsection, I will summarize the bargaining power
estimates.
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4.6.1 State transition probabilities
Several variables in the state evolve deterministicaly given the current
state and actions. As shown in the estimation section, some of the components
of the state evolve stochastically. Such variables are: oil production, price of
oil, trend in cost of drilling, and T (final period). In this subsection, I will go
over the results of all those estimations.
Oil
In table 4.7, I present the summary statistics of the distribution of the
oil transition parameters. Pesaran, 1995 argues that computing the simple
averages, even with dynamic variables, gives an unbiased estimator of the
summary statistics. The mean of “Lag oil” is 0.91 and the median is 0.93. That
means that if nobody drills in a field from one period to the next, production
will be around 93% of what it was the previous month. Adding the mean of
“Prod Well” and “Lag Prod Well” gives 2,220, which is the average production
from the first well the period after drilled. Similarly, adding the mean of “Inj
Well” and “Lag Inj Well” gives 2,166. The estimates of “Total Prod Wells”
and “Total Inj Wells” are -213 and -38 respectively, which means that every
subsequent production and injection well will be a little less productive than
the previous one. Finally, “Others Prod Wells” and “Others Inj Wells” indicate
that on average, whenever a neighbor drills a new production well, a firm’s
production will fall in around 39 barrels, and if they drill a new injection well
production will likely increase. These last parameters are important because
they show that when neighbors drill, a firm’s production is affected. If a
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neighbor drills a production well, the firm will be worse off, but if they drill
an injection, the firm will be slightly better off.
Table 4.7: Oil Transition Coefficients
Mean Median St. Div.
Lag Oil 0.91 0.93 0.08
Prod Well 729.09 519.26 1095.43
Lag Prod Well 1491.44 788.56 3494.58
Inj Well 653.02 325.39 1043.49
Lag Inj Well 1513.36 815.89 3447.33
Tot Prod Wells -213.95 -89.70 1450.18
Tot Inj Wells -38.54 -8.79 230.25
Others Prod Well -39.07 -0.88 666.70
Others Inj Well 0.38 10.23 672.36
N 501 - -
R2 0.93 0.95 0.08
The estimates for each field were computed inde-
pendently. The numbers displayed are the summary
statistics of such estimates.
Price and Cost
I modeled the evolution of price of oil as a Markov-Switching-Models.
I did not use simple autorregressive models because because prices and costs
do not increase (or decrease) monotonically. Table 4.8 shows the results of
running a Markov-Switching-Model for price of oil and cost of drilling. On the
first column I present the results for price of oil. When the state is “bad”,
we would expect the price of oil to decrease in around 2%. If we are in a
“good” state, then we would expect the price of oil to increase in around 8%
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Table 4.8: Price and Cost Transitions
Price Cost
St1 Lag φ1 0.98 0.95
237.44 82.82
St2 Lag φ2 1.08 1.06
110.19 240.13
St1 p11 0.92 0.78
St2 p21 0.38 0.26
pt = µ
p + φstpt−1 + εst , P (st|st−1) = P
t statistics in parentheses
Methodology: Hamilton, J. (1990)
the following period. If we are in a “bad” state, the probability of staying in
a bad state is 92%. If we are in a “good” state, the probability of staying in
the good state is 62%. Note that the parameters of the evolution of cost are
quite similar.
Hazard of T
T is the last period in the game, and it is also when unitization happens.
I modeled T as Weibull and log-normal survival function, where the mean
depends on the state of the game. The results are displayed in table 4.9.
Since the Weibull specification is, in general, more flexible than the log-
normal, I will rely on it for the second stage BBL. The parameters presented in
table 4.9 are consistent with what we would expect given current legislation.
In particular, firms decrease the drilling activity after producing heavily at
the begining. This signals the TRRC that the field is “reasonably developed”,
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log acres 0.667 -0.261
(0.499) (0.193)
log oil -2.616∗ 0.906∗∗∗
(1.033) (0.170)
pct. oil 1.667 -0.923∗
(1.618) (0.440)









The first column is the results of a survival analysis
assuming T follows a Weibull distribution and the
second assumes T follows a log-normal one. Only
considering fields where unitization was achieved.
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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and firms can seek unitization. The variable “Pct. Oil” is defined as the oil
produced in a certain period, divided by the maximum oil produced in a period
up to now. The negative estimate in the Weibull model, means that P(T =
t + 1) is lower if oil production at t is smaller relative to previous years. The
positive estimate of “Years without drill” suggests that P(T = t+ 1) increases
when firms stop drilling. Finally, the variable “log oil” is the cumulative oil
produced up to now. The positive sign suggests the probability of T = t + 1
increases with cumulative production.
4.6.2 Conditional choice probabilities
To implement BBL, it is also necessary to estimate the probabilities of
firms’ action conditional on observables. During the development phase, firms
will drill production wells, injection wells or do nothing. In the final period,
they will decide whether to join a unit or not. The estimates of these three
conditional choice probabilities will be shown in the following subsections.
Conditional Choice of Drilling a Well
I modeled the conditional choice probability of drilling a production well
and an injection well with probit functions, as well as linear specifications. The
results for the conditional choice of drilling a production well and an injection
well are in tables 4.10 and 4.11, respectively.
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 suggest that firms will drill more production wells
in fields with a larger area. Also, firms tend to drill more when the price of
oil is higher, and when cost of drilling is lower. Drilling, specifically injection
118
Table 4.10: Conditional choice of drilling a production well
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
firms = 1 0.04∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.00) (0.018) (0.023) (0.02)
log acres 2.36∗∗∗ 38.54∗∗∗
(0.312) (7.30)
log price 0.01∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.00) (0.025) (0.032) (0.08)
log cost -0.01∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.00 -0.081∗ 0.071 0.12
(0.001) (0.001) (0.00) (0.035) (0.041) (0.15)
log oil -0.10 -1.283∗∗∗ -1.85∗∗∗ 16.786∗∗∗ -8.283∗ -18.56∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.202) (0.20) (3.483) (3.692) (3.73)
own w. 2.28∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ 13.924∗∗∗ 4.129∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.034) (0.03) (0.366) (0.480) (0.61)
others w. -0.06∗ -1.905∗∗∗ -1.83∗∗∗ 1.225∗∗∗ -5.771∗∗∗ -9.81∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.035) (0.03) (0.346) (0.480) (0.61)
years -0.30∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -9.179∗∗∗ -9.684∗∗∗ -7.86∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.01) (0.174) (0.199) (0.23)
cons. -0.16∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.01 -3.856∗∗∗ -3.682∗∗∗ -5.113∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.05) (0.404) (0.488) (2.10)
log σ2 -1.944∗∗∗ -1.74∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.084)
Field Q. X X
Field FE X X X X
Year FE X X
Obs. 205060 205060 205060 205060 205060 203623
The first three columns are linear models, and the last three are probit models.
The first is linear regression, the second with field fixed effects and the last also
with year fixed effects. The fourth is simple probit, the fifth has field fixed effects
and the sixth also has year fixed effects. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
119
Table 4.11: Conditional choice of drilling an injection well
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
firms = 1 0.026∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.029)
log acres 0.672∗∗ 4.306
(0.244) (8.666)
log price 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.029) (0.040)
log cost 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.125∗∗ -0.122∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.040) (0.049)
log oil 2.218∗∗∗ 1.747∗∗∗ 1.470∗∗∗ 80.304∗∗∗ 40.124∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.158) (0.159) (4.808) (5.165)
own wells 1.174∗∗∗ -0.943∗∗∗ -0.916∗∗∗ 6.417∗∗∗ -0.597
(0.016) (0.027) (0.027) (0.237) (0.377)
others wells 0.122∗∗∗ -1.434∗∗∗ -1.395∗∗∗ 2.794∗∗∗ -5.257∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.389) (0.515)
years disc. -0.154∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -6.796∗∗∗ -7.293∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.197) (0.235)
constant -0.034∗∗ 0.022 0.023 -1.337∗∗ -1.546∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.043) (0.469) (0.602)
log σ2 -1.205∗∗∗
(0.095)
Field quality X X
Year FE X
Field FE X X X
Observations 205060 205060 205060 205060 205060
The first three columns are linear models, and the last thwo are probit
models. The first is linear regression, the second with field fixed effects and
the last also with year fixed effects. The fourth is simple probit, and the
fifth has field fixed effects. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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wells, will increase if production is high, and if there has been more wells
drilled in the field. For the second stage of BBL, I chose specification 4, which
is a probit model without field fixed effects. I did this to avoid relying on
estimates of field fixed effects in the second stage of BBL. Moreover, for choice
models I prefer a probit than a linear specification.
Conditional Choice of Unitization
I also modeled the conditional choice of joining a unit with probit and
linear functions. The estimation results are in table 4.12. Interestingly, table
4.12 suggests that units are more likely to happen in fields that are “more
homogeneous.” Particularly, the probability of having a unit increases in fields
where the biggest firm has a relatively smaller share of the land leased in
the field. This result ecos previous qualitative research that suggests that
units are more likely to happen within firms that are “more alike” in size. The
“Minimum Area” coefficient is also positive, being further supports such claim.
Again, the preferred specification for the second state is number 4, which is a
probit model without fixed effects, but controlling for field quality estimates.
On the one hand, the sign of the estimates align with anecdotal evidence, but
more importantly, I do not rely on estimate of field fixed effects for stage 2 of
BBL.
To summarize, using a wide variety of reduced form methods, we esti-
mate the “first stage” parameters of the model. Those parameters feed into
the state transition functions and the conditional choice probabilities. The
state transition functions we estimated are oil production, price of oil and the
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Table 4.12: Conditional choice of unitization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wells 0.152∗∗∗ 0.065 0.044 0.946∗∗∗ 1.226∗∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗







firms -0.051 -0.033 -0.080 -0.183 -0.259 -0.414
(0.030) (0.086) (0.122) (0.101) (0.224) (0.314)
pct. min area 0.112 0.079 0.500 0.756
(0.152) (0.490) (0.852) (1.099)
pct. max area -0.046 -0.126 -0.419 -0.876
(0.030) (0.155) (0.500) (0.774)
relative area 0.055 0.111 0.120 0.168 0.543 0.471
(0.112) (0.107) (0.114) (0.376) (0.545) (0.677)
constant -0.575∗∗ 0.406 0.265 -3.707∗∗∗ -6.955∗∗∗ -8.878∗
(0.211) (0.235) (0.403) (0.877) (2.099) (3.566)
log σ2 0.606 0.914
(0.495) (0.617)
Field quality X X
Field FE X X X X
Year FE X X
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 240
The first three columns are linear models, and the last three are probit models.
The first is linear regression, the second with field fixed effects and the last also
with year fixed effects. The fourth is simple probit, the fifth has field fixed effects
and the sixth also has year fixed effects. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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hazard of T . With respect to conditional choices, we estimated the probability
of drilling a new well given a state, and the probability of unitization given T
and other characteristics of the field.
Second Stage - moments of shock functions
In the second stage, I estimate the moments of the distribution of four
sets of random shocks. The first set is the mean and the variance of the
shock in cost of drilling a production well. The second set is the same but
for injection wells. The next is set is the shock in fixed costs. Finally, I will
estimate the mean and the variance of the shock in cost of unitization.
The estimates are shown in table 4.13. Remember that the total cost
each company has to pay when drilling a production well is Ct + ξ
P . To put
things in perspective C0, on average starts at 543k. That would mean that if
a firm draws a shock of cost of drilling a production well at the mean, they
would pay 543 − 67 = $476k. Note that the standard deviation of the cost
of a production well is substantial with respect to the mean of the shock.
Nevertheless, it is a less than 25 % of the overall cost of drilling a production
well. That is still economically important, but reasonable.
Injection wells are on average $30k cheaper than production wells. It
is interesting that the variance in the shock is a substantially less than the
variance of production wells. This could be because at the stage when injection
wells are drilled, firms know a lot more about the fields than when they drill
production wells. Also, if firms do not drill anything during a period, on
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Table 4.13: Shock parameters
Production Well µP -67.579
σP 131.612
Injection Well µI -97.954
σI 74.101
Fixed Cost µF .408
σF 1.3815
Unitization Cost µθ 30.808
σθ 22.160
Estimates obtained running the second stage
of BBL with 1,500 perturbations. The profit
function and the rest of the measures while
running the algorithm was normalized to
thousand of dollars. These estimates should
be interpreted in thousand of dollars.
average they pay close to 0. That could be interpreted as the fixed cost of
operating a field. These numbers are consistent the the fact that in extracting
oil from the ground, it is expensive to drill new wells, but cheap to operate
them. Finally, the estimates suggest that the cost of unitizing is on average
$30k per firm in the unit. That means that a 4 firm unitization agreement is
around $ 120k.
Third Stage - bargaining parameters
In the last stage I estimated the bargaining parameters. To do that, I
first recovered the counterfactual value functions of what would have happened
if firms that unitized would have not done so. By doing that, I have all
the elements in the first order conditions of the NiN equilibrium. The only
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unknown elements are the bargaining parameters.
The summary statistics of the bargaining parameters are in table 4.14.
The first row shows the mean of the bargaining parameter. The next column
is the standard deviation. The third and the fourth column are the summary
statistics of the bargaining parameter divided by the relative size of a firm in a
field. Firm 1 is always the biggest in the field and firm 4 is the smallest. Note
how bigger firms have higher bargaining parameters. Nevertheless, relative to
their share in the field, smaller firms are better off than bigger ones. These
results support the anecdotal evidence that smaller firms are relatively better
than larger ones in terms of negotiation.
Table 4.14: Estimates of bargaining parameters
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
bi 0.63 0.32 0.05 0.01
0.22 0.23 0.10 0.02
bi
ai
0.91 1.73 2.33 1.09
0.37 2.22 3.47 0.02
I estimate bargaining parameters for every
firm in every field. Above are the mean and
the standard deviation of the distribution by
firms. Firms are ordered by area size, firm 1
is the biggest in the field. The second panel
show the summary statistics of the bargain-
ing parameters divided by the relative size of
a firm in a field.
Finally, to extrapolate the bargaining parameters to fields where uniti-
zation never happened, I regressed such parameters on several variables. The
results of such regressions are in table 4.15. Note that more than 70% of the
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variation can be explained by the relative area of a firm in a field as a per-
centage of the total. From the regression it is clear that firms with a bigger
area will have a greater bargaining power. Nevertheless, if the relative size of
a firm in a field increases in 10%, the bargaining parameter will only increase
in .0314.
4.7 Counterfactuals
Originally, my goal was to quantify the welfare loss due to the CPE that
happens when several firms try to exploit the same oilfield. The machinery
developed in the paper also allows me to evaluate some interesting policy
implication related to forcing or encouraging cooperation among firms. In
this section, I will describe how I adapted the model to achieve such goals.
Moreover, since I ran each counterfactual separately for each field, I will be
able to distinguish how the different policies affect fields depending on the
field’s specific qualities.
The five counterfactuals I will compute are:
• Central planner’s solution
• Compulsory unitization
– Make firms unitize if firms that have leased over 60% of the area in
a field want to unitize
14Bargaining parameters are normalized such that they add up to 1.
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Table 4.15: Bargaining Extrapolation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
area, ai 0.467
∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090)
firm order -0.107∗∗∗
(0.019)
firm=2 -0.107 -0.107 -0.107 -0.107
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
firm=3 -0.308∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
firm=4 -0.331∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
EXTER -0.053 -0.056 -0.050
(3.534) (3.662) (3.966)
INTERF 0.279 0.327 0.506
(8.520) (8.573) (9.204)
field area 0.000 0.000
(9.221) (9.723)
pct. max area -0.030
(7.281)
[1em] constant 0.400∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.079)
Observations 188 188 188 188 188
r2 0.706 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720
Estimated by OLS, where the dependent variable is the bargaining parameter
of the firm. The independent variables are relative area ai, and the relative
size of the firm, in the sense that firm 1 is the biggest in the field, and firm 4
is the smallest in the field.
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• Voluntary unitization
– Let firms vote for unitization each period
– Omit the fair sharing rule restriction
– Firms can vote for unitization whenever they want, and there is no
sharing rule restriction
4.7.1 Definition of Counterfactuals
Welfare loss due to common pool externality - “Planner”
To recover the welfare loss due to the CPE, I computed the equilibrium
assuming that each field was owned exploited by a single firm. In this case,
the central planner is trying to maximize the discounted sum of profits, just
like firms do. An alternative to this assumption could be that instead of
maximizing profits, the central planner is maximizing oil production as long
as it is economical, or oil by well, or some other measure of efficiency. I prefer
to stick with the assumption that the central planner maximizes profits since
I am isolate the loss due to the CPE. If on top of assuming there is a single
operator, I assume that such operator maximizes a different value function,
the number I would be recovering would be the welfare loss due to the fact
that firms maximize profits, confounded with the fact that the CPE caused by
competition for the common resource.
Compulsory unitization as implemented in other states - “Compulsory”
To recover the results of how compulsory unitization would change pro-
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duction and profits, I assumed that each field was being exploited by the firms
original number of firms in it. The TRRC still restricts voting for unitization
to happen only when the field is reasonably developed, and there is still un-
certainty of when that will happen. The difference with the base case comes
in the voting mechanism. Now, if firms that encompass more that 60% of the
area in a field voter for unitization, then the whole field will be worked as a
unique unit starting from that moment. This will potentially change welfare
in several ways. On the extensive margin, we expect more units to happen,
especially in fields where there are only two firms. On the intensive margin,
we are expecting units to be bigger, specifically in fields where there are more
than two firms.
There is not restriction in the way firms share profits -“Sharing”
To recover how the production and profits would change if the TRRC
relaxed the restriction the the sharing rule must be fair, I assumed that if the
overall profits from unit operations minus the cost of unitization is higher than
the firms’ profits working separately, then unitization will happen. In other
words, if there are gains from unitization in terms of profits, firms will find a
sharing rule that is Pareto improving.
Omit the reasonably developed rule -“Time”
To assess what would happen if the TRRC did not force firms to vote
for unitization until the field is reasonably developed, I assumed that firms
vote for unitization the first period. As before, a unit will be formed with the
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firms that wanted to join the unit, and profits will be shared based on area.
Omit both voluntary unitization restrictions -“Voluntary”
Finally, I was interested in recovering the effect of omitting both re-
strictions to voluntary unitization at once. To achieve that, I assumed that
firms could vote during the first period, and if there are gains from working as
one firm, then a unit will happen. It is important to note here, that it is very
likely that the number of units will increase substantially, but since there is a
transaction cost unitization does not necessarily have to happen.
4.7.2 Counterfactual Results
I ran the five counterfactuals separately for each field. The results are
summarized in tables 4.16 and 4.17. Table 4.16 summarizes how firms’ profits
would change under the different counterfactuals. Each column refers to a
specific counterfactual. The first and the second rows show the median and
the mean of the distribution of increase in profits a percentage of profits under
the current policy. The third row is the mean increase in profits, but weighted
by current profits. Analyzing these three rows together give interesting results.
Taking for example the “Planner” counterfactual we can see that half of the
fields would increase rents in more than 17.3% if they were operated by a
central planner maximizing profits. Nevertheless, weighting by profits, the
number would only be 26.2%. The fourth row in table 4.16 suggests that
taking just the 501 fields in sample, the planner would increase welfare in
around $4.28B dollars. That would mean that the rents of each field would
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increase in over $8.54.
Table 4.16: Counterfactuals summary
Planner Compulsory Sharing Time Voluntary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall 26.2 % 13.9 % 7.1 % 1.7% 21.8%
Median 20.0% 6.5% 1.1% 1.0% 13.9%
Mean 31.0% 12.9 % 7.5 % 7.8% 16.2%
In sample $8.54M $4.47M $2.71M $1.12M $6.31M
By field 4.28B $2.24B $1.36B $0.56B $3.16B
Each column in the table summarizes what would happen under different
counterfactuals. Each counterfactual was run in the 364 fields with either 2
or 3 firms. The first and the second rows show the median of the increase or
decrease in welfare of each counterfactual compared to the base case. The
third takes the overall production of all fields under each counterfactual
over the overall production of the base case. The fourth row is the dollar
amount increase considering every field in the sample, the fifth is the dollar
amount increase by field. The last row extrapolates the dollar amounts to
every field in Texas.
Comparing between counterfactuals, note that making voluntary uni-
tization easier by omitting both restrictions is the policy that would get us
closer to the potential gain of eliminating the CPE. Eliminating the CPE
could potentially increase profits in 26%, while facilitatiting voluntary uni-
tization would increase profits in 21%. Nevertheless, when eliminating one
restriction on voluntary unitization without the other will not be as substan-
tial. If the TRRC eliminated the sharing rule restrictions firms would increase
profits in around 7.1%. There are two opposing forces that influence this
change in efficiency: the negative one is that looking forward firms know that
they will eventually unitize and they will try to capture the common resource
faster; the positive one is that more units will be achieved. Finally, allowing
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firms to unitize the first stage would increase overall profits in just 1.7%. On
the one hand, there will not be a loss due to inefficient exploitation of the
field at the beginning, but on the other, firms that did not want to unitize,
will still be skeptical of it. Finally, compulsory unitization would increase
profits in around 13.9%, which is higher than eliminating each voluntary uni-
tization restriction separately, but lower than eliminating both at the same
time. Moreover, it represents around 50% of the profit loss due to the CPE.
Table 4.17 helps understand where the increase in profits comes from.
Also, one could argue that although firms will maximize profits given the
legislation, regulators care more about overall production and drilling activity
than firms’ profits. Table 4.17 analyzes 5 variables: overall oil production
by field, number of producing wells, number of injector wells, percentage of
wells that are injectors, oil extraction by production well, and oil extraction by
well (taking injectors into account). The first column gives the mean, median
and standard deviation under the current policy, the other five analyze the
counterfactuals.
Table 4.17 shows that by eliminating the CPE production by field would
increase from an average of 503,740 to 645,157. That is almost a 28% increase
in overall production. The drilling statistics below show that this increase
comes from three sources: overall, there will be more drilling in these fields;
also, the proportion of injector wells will be higher, so the negative externality
of having more production wells will be lower; and the timing of drilling will
be optimal. Each production well will increase its output from 94k barrels per
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Table 4.17: Counterfactuals: production summary
Current Planner Comp. Sharing Time Vol.
Oil by Field 503,740 645,157 582,582 528,642 519,394 614,230
284,756 360,719 318,625 295,981 325,846 364,835
597,748 818,756 729,072 674,013 606,436 769,691
PW by Field 5.76 6.28 6.3 5.65 5.84 6.33
7 8 7 7 7 7
2.08 3.1 2.76 2.17 2.33 2.88
IW by Field 3.24 4.43 3.9 3.24 3.39 4.2
2 4 3 2 3 4
3.29 4.28 3.91 3.34 3.32 4.11
Pct. Inj. 0.28 0.33 0.3 0.29 0.3 0.31
0.3 0.45 0.36 0.25 0.35 0.4
0.27 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.3
Oil by PW 94,665 108,363 91,025 100,645 94,498 101,627
48,017 63,091 50,891 50,891 52,451 60,301
145,086 155,656 108,026 152,830 116,729 174,388
Oil by W 51,962 51,276 49,617 54,304 49,612 52,974
32,671 31,391 31,236 32,467 31,131 32,313
64,308 60,986 57,601 75,249 57,858 64,551
For every variable, the first row is the mean, the second the median and the third
the standard deviation. Each column represents a a counterfactual: current =
current policy, Planner = planner’s solution assuming rent maximization, com-
pulsory = compulsory unitization, No Sharing = firms are not restricted to any
sharing rule, No Time = firms can form units the first period.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of increase in production
Notes: The counterfactual was run once for each of the 501 fields with either 2,
3 or 4 firms. The histograms shows the distribution of the percentage increase in
production under each of the counterfactuals compared to the increase the current
legislation.
production well to 108k. Surprisingly, when also taking injection wells into
account, productivity by well remains almost unchanged.
The histograms in figure 4.6 give a more detailed view of the distri-
bution of the increase in profits by field due to each policy. The important
takeaway from these counterfactuals is that for most of the fields, the increase
or decrease under the new policy are modest. The histograms also rise the
question of how the characteristics fields affect if they are affected by the
counterfactual policies studied in the paper. To achieve that, I ran a linear
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regression of the increase in profits due to the counterfactuals against number
of firms, quality of the field and distribution of firms in the field. The results
are in table 4.18. As expected, the interference and the externality factors are
negatively related with the increase in profits. That means that if the poten-
tial of a well does not decrease with the sequence of drilling then the potential
increase in efficiency is smaller. Also, if drilling by other companies do not
affect the current production do not impact the current production of a well,
then the potential increase in profits is also smaller.
Unexpectedly, efficiency can potentially increase more in fields with 3
firms than in fields with 2 or 4 firms. One would expect that in fields with more
firms, the potential to increase profitability when eliminating the common
pool externality is greater. In fields with 4 firms, I had to apply a further
computation restriction in which firms only produced for 12 periods instead of
15. This makes the potential increase in profitability due to efficiency smaller.
The counterfactuals analyzed up to now give a general picture of the
average potential increase each policy has in terms of profits and production.
Also, they show that the increase comes from drilling more wells and drilling
more productive wells. Nevertheless, they do not show how timing of drilling
also affects these measures. Figures 4.7 and 4.7 are an example of how produc-
tion is affected in two fields by the different counterfactuals. Both examples
show fields with 2 firms. The upper left graph shows the current policy vs. the
central planner’s solution. The green line is the planner’s production and the
yellow the addition of production by both firms. The rest of the plots com-
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Table 4.18: Correlations between Counterfactuals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
interf -0.453 -0.320∗∗∗ -0.108∗ -0.048
(0.254) (0.090) (0.044) (0.057)
exter -0.578∗ -0.076 -0.095∗ -0.153∗∗
(0.230) (0.081) (0.040) (0.050)
wellq -0.276∗∗∗ 0.002 0.007 0.009
(0.044) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010)
f maxcompanies=2 -0.312∗∗ -0.124∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.011
(0.117) (0.041) (0.020) (0.025)
f maxcompanies=3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
f maxcompanies=4 -0.762∗∗∗ -0.135∗ -0.043 0.013
(0.164) (0.059) (0.029) (0.036)
pctmaxarea 0.167 -0.153 0.015 -0.068
(0.271) (0.096) (0.047) (0.059)
pctminarea -0.075 0.104 -0.022 0.083
(0.229) (0.081) (0.039) (0.049)
Constant 4.682∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.171) (0.084) (0.105)
Observations 250 245 247 243
r2 0.211 0.107 0.073 0.075
The first three columns are linear models, and the last thwo are
probit models. The first is linear regression, the second with field
fixed effects and the last also with year fixed effects. The fourth is
simple probit, and the fifth has field fixed effects. *** p ≤ 0.01, **
p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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pare the current schedule vs the different policies. The table below shows the
drilling activity and productivity of wells under the counterfactual policies.
Note in figure 4.7 that the increase in production comes from the fact
that the central planner drills more. In this case, compulsory unitization and
omitting the sharing rule restriction would also increase profits. The reason is
that unitization is achieved (and wanted) under these policies, but not under
the current policy. In this case, unitization would also be achieved if firms were
allowed to vote the first period instead of waiting until the field is reasonably
developed. When comparing production by firms vs. the central planner, note
how the central planner takes longer to reach potential production compared
to the firms working separately.
In figure 4.8 the dynamics are a little different. Here, it is clearer that
the central planner produces a little slower than the firms working separately.
Nevertheless, There is virtually no gain from any of the coutnerfactual policy.
Contrasting figure 4.8 with 4.7, one can see in 4.7 that the firms in the field
are very different in size, in 4.8 they are very similar15.
To summarize, in this section I present five counterfactuals, the first
measures the loss in profits and production due to the CPE. The other four
explore three alternative policies that the TRRC could implement in the Texas
legislation. Easing voluntary unitization by getting rid of the two restrictions
placed by the TRRC is the alternative that recovers more of the planner’s
15That can be inferred by production.
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Figure 4.7: Field Development under Counterfactuals
Base Compulsory Forced No Time Planner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ProdW 6 8 8 5 9
InjProd 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
ProdPW 215307 293529 294330 313437 192976
ProeW 129184 146765 147165 156718 96488
Unit No No No NA NA
Notes: Each plot compares the development of this specific field under the current policy
vs. under a counterfactual. The table shows how many production wells, the percentage of
injection wells, production per well, and unitization decisions under each counterfactual.
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Figure 4.8: Field Development under Counterfactuals
Base Compulsory Forced No Time Planner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ProdW 7 7 7 7 9
InjProd 0.5 0.5 0.46 0.5 0.44
ProdPW 89677 95425 92888 95464 76400
ProeW 44838 47713 50017 47732 42975
Unit No No No NA NA
Notes: Each plot compares the development of this specific field under the current policy
vs. under a counterfactual. The table shows how many production wells, the percentage of
injection wells, production per well, and unitization decisions under each counterfactual.
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solution. Omitting only one of the restrictions would increase profits and pro-
duction, but less than incorporating compulsory unitization. As seen in figure
4.6, fields are affected differently by the counterfactuals. As expected, fields
where the externality and the interference factors are high are more susceptible
to changes in legislation. Surprisingly, fields with three firms are the ones with
the highest potential increase. Finally, in this section shows two examples of
how specific fields are developed under the different counterfactuals.
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4.8 Conclusion
The exploitation of a single oilfield by several firms is a typical example
of the common pool externality (CPE) that has hunted the oil industry for
decades. If agents facing the CPE assigned a single operator to exploit the
whole resource, then such operator would not face the CPE. In the oil and
gas business, there is a form of contract that achieves that called voluntary
unitization. Every major producing state, but Texas, go beyond voluntary
unitization and can make firms that do not want to join units to join. In this
paper, I first measure the loss in profits and production due to the CPE in
Texas. I also, evaluated three alternative policies: relaxing voluntary uniti-
zation, implementing compulsory unitization as in other states, and forcing
firms to unitize even if they do not want to.
I modeled how firms develop an oilfield and how they form units through-
out time. The proposed model accounts for the restrictions placed by the
TRRC on voluntary unitization. To compute the welfare loss due to the CPE,
I assumend that each field was exploited by a single operator. To assess how
welfare could improve if the TRRC relaxed the restrictions on voluntary uniti-
zation, I modify the parts of the model that resemble such restrictions. Finally,
I change features of the coalition formation process to recover what would hap-
pen under compulsory unitization.
The counterfactual analysis suggests that the welfare loss due to the
CPE is actually substantial. Throughout the 30 years of analysis, having a
single operator by field would have increased rents from the 501 fields in the
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sample in around $4.28B, which is an increase of 26.2% from the rent of those
fields. The source of this increase in rents comes from two sources: an increase
in overall production per field, and the increase in injection wells compared to
production wells. Eliminating both restrictions placed on voluntary unitization
would have improve rents of around 21.8%, which adds up to $3.16. Finally,






As described in the paper, my data allows me to try several different
specification of both, the regression discontinuity and the difference in differ-
ence design. The main tables are presented in the paper, the objective of this
appendix is to present the results that are not central to the paper.
A.1 Regression Discontinuity
The main RD results presented in chapter 2 are considering bandwidth
of 1 mile and 5 miles around the New Mexico and Texas horizontal part of the
border. In this appendix I will present the regression results and the graphs
for 10 miles around the horizontal part of the border. Moreover, I will present
the tables of results for the three bandwidths of the vertical part of the border,
as well as the regression discontinuity figures. I decided to take the horizontal
part of the border as the leading experiment, because the respective robustness
checks are stronger, suggesting a better natural experiment.
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Table A.1: Regression Discontinuity, horizontal border, 10 mile band-
width
Polynomial Order 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable
log cum oil 0.564*** 0.615*** 0.614*** 0.614***
(0.188) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191)
log 6 month oil 1.516*** 1.468*** 1.467*** 1.468***
(0.17) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173)
log 60 month oil 0.729*** 0.696*** 0.695*** 0.696***
(0.16) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
depth -678.717 -1011.65 -1011.14 -1009.56
(1154.84) (1032.13) (1032.35) (1032.49)
elevation 14.659 -71.399 -70.989 -71.234
(106.378) (109.69) (109.686) (109.652)
longitude 0.003 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.241) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232)
drilling year -1.008 -1.084 -1.081 -1.078
(0.854) (0.869) (0.869) (0.869)
Each pair of estimate/standard error represents the average treatment
effect estimated with a different regression discontinuity design. Rows in-
dicate different dependent variables, and columns are different polynomial
orders. Wells in New Mexico and Texas drilled after 1778. Treatment
means that the well is in New Mexico, control wells are located in Texas.
Standard errors are clustered at field level. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p
≤ 0.1
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Table A.2: Regression Discontinuity, vertical border, 1 mile band-
width
Polynomial Order 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable
log cum oil -0.33 -0.327 -0.324 -0.353
(0.327) (0.328) (0.328) (0.327)
log 6 month oil -0.136 -0.143 -0.13 -0.148
(0.276) (0.276) (0.276) (0.276)
log 60 month oil -0.263 -0.263 -0.271 -0.274
(0.246) (0.247) (0.247) (0.247)
depth 692.016 723.325 720.646 701.985
(687.976) (693.157) (692.473) (700.397)
elevation 91.6623 93.0643 89.628 92.5322
(109.475) (105.235) (103.106) (107.063)
longitude 0.023 0.024 0.017 0.016
(0.158) (0.155) (0.154) (0.149)
drilling year -0.595 -0.69 -0.469 -0.413
(2.216) (2.132) (2.039) (2.031)
Each pair of estimate/standard error represents the average treatment
effect estimated with a different regression discontinuity design. Rows in-
dicate different dependent variables, and columns are different polynomial
orders. Wells in New Mexico and Texas drilled after 1778. Treatment
means that the well is in New Mexico, control wells are located in Texas.
Standard errors are clustered at field level. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p
≤ 0.1
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Table A.3: Regression Discontinuity, vertical border, 5 mile band-
width
Polynomial Order 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable
log cum oil 0.256* 0.308** 0.309** 0.307**
(0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157)
log 6 month oil 0.574*** 0.572*** 0.57*** 0.576***
(0.157) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
log 60 month oil 0.251** 0.288** 0.29** 0.292**
(0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136)
depth 1059.49* 909.526* 914.588* 907.872*
(719.598) (700.304) (701.041) (698.103)
elevation 0.768957 -1.68839 -1.20903 -1.23137
(92.2801) (92.8205) (93.4422) (93.0591)
longitude -0.186 -0.176 -0.175 -0.175
(0.187) (0.18) (0.179) (0.179)
drilling year 5.219*** 5.856*** 5.832*** 5.833***
(2.241) (1.967) (1.955) (1.963)
Each pair of estimate/standard error represents the average treatment
effect estimated with a different regression discontinuity design. Rows in-
dicate different dependent variables, and columns are different polynomial
orders. Wells in New Mexico and Texas drilled after 1778. Treatment
means that the well is in New Mexico, control wells are located in Texas.
Standard errors are clustered at field level. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p
≤ 0.1
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Table A.4: Regression Discontinuity, vertical border, 10 mile bandwidth
Pol. Order 1 2 3 4
Dep. Variable
log cum oil 0.858*** 0.801*** 0.801*** 0.802***
(0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.096)
log 6 m. oil 0.939*** 1.036*** 1.036*** 1.036***
(0.091) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
log 60 m. oil 0.481*** 0.566*** 0.565*** 0.565***
(0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
depth -224.007 52.099 53.418 53.415
(690.991) (660.026) (660.039) (660.321)
elevation -241.015*** -260.707*** -259.623*** -260.807***
(124.076) (132.092) (131.554) (132.006)
longitude -0.459*** -0.452*** -0.452*** -0.452***
(0.238) (0.218) (0.218) (0.218)
drilling year 2.829 3.325* 3.331* 3.33*
(2.523) (2.392) (2.394) (2.394)
Each pair of estimate/standard error represents the average treatment effect
estimated with a different regression discontinuity design. Rows indicate differ-
ent dependent variables, and columns are different polynomial orders. Wells in
New Mexico and Texas drilled after 1778. Treatment means that the well is in
New Mexico, control wells are located in Texas. Standard errors are clustered
at field level. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1
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Figure A.1: Regression discontinuity, vertical border, 5 mile bandwidth
Notes: The line represents the linear trend of each variable before and after the
-103 longitude line, which delimits Texas and New Mexico. The data in the graph
is limited to latitudes between 30◦ and 34◦.
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Figure A.2: Oil production in the first 60 months by wells in New Mexico and
Texas
The lines are the aerage cumulative production in the first
60 years of a well drilled during the x-axis year.
A.2 Difference in Difference
The main DID result is for cumulative oil produced over the lifetime of
the well. In this appendix, I will present the results of the DID model where
the dependent variable represents the first 60 months of production instead of
the overall cumulative production.
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Table A.5: Difference in difference, dependent variable: log 60 months
of production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ind NN af. 1977 0.418∗ 0.418∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗ 0.509∗
(0.171) (0.170) (0.162) (0.163) (0.202)
After 1977 0.189∗ 0.194 -0.0752 -0.0257 -0.412∗∗
(0.091) (0.100) (0.124) (0.162) (0.152)
Treatment 0.459 0.460 0.291 0.228 -2.455











Constant 8.118∗∗∗ 9.752 8.365∗∗∗ 8.734∗∗∗ 8.371∗∗∗
(0.137) (29.848) (0.154) (0.233) (0.219)
Time FE X X X
Field FE X X X X X
Observations 109396 109396 109396 105317 69320
The first column is a field fix effects model without controlling for year. The
second column is as the first, but also controls for year. The third, fourth and
fifth models also has time fixed effects. The dependent variable is log of the
first 60 days of production of each well. Standard errors clustered at the field
level reported. Every well in the sample was drilled in either New Mexico or




Table B.1: Counterfactuals summary
Planner Compulsory Sharing Time Voluntary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall 26.2 % 10.0 % 7.2 % 5.2% 22.9%
Median 20.0% 7.4% .02% 027% 12.3%
Mean 31.0% 11.0 % 1.7 % 8.0% 11.7%
By field $8.54M $2.75M $1.91M $2.2M $6.91M
In sample 4.28B $1.38B $0.95B $1.14B $3.46B
Each column in the table summarizes what would happen under different
counterfactuals. Each counterfactual was run in the 501 fields with either
2, 3 of 4 firms. The first and the second rows show the median of the
increase or decrease in welfare of each counterfactual compared to the
base case. The third takes the overall production of all fields under each
counterfactual over the overall production of the base case. The fourth
row is the dollar amount increase considering every field in the sample,
the fifth is the dollar amount increase by field. The last row extrapolates
the dollar amounts to every field in Texas.
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Table B.2: Counterfactuals: production summary
Current Planner Comp. Sharing Time Vol.
Oil by Field 503,740 645,157 582,796 554,574 586,511 638,445
284,756 360,719 304,311 254,942 306,480 305,945
597,748 818,756 722,311 769,439 754,011 845,519
PW by Field 5.76 6.28 6.15 5.53 5.82 6.24
7 8 7 7 7 8
2.08 3.10 2.79 2.2 2.09 3.03
IW by Field 3.24 4.43 3.83 3.01 3.38 3.99
2 4 3 1 3 1
3.29 4.28 3.89 3.29 3.28 4.21
Pct. Inj. 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.3
0.3 0.45 0.42 0.2 0.3 0.36
0.27 0.31 0.29 0.3 0.27 0.3
Oil by PW 94,665 108,363 94,528 121,658 103,325 105,485
48,017 63,091 58,845 46,870 52,502 53,870
145,086 155,656 112,206 222,788 144,355 150,817
Oil by Well 51,962 51,276 51,539 58,660 57,052 51,655
32,671 31,391 31,236 31,278 30,957 31,212
64,308 60,986 62,482 85,473 71,247 62,897
For every variable, the first row is the mean, the second the median and the third
the standard deviation. Each column represents a a counterfactual: current =
current policy, Planner = planner’s solution assuming rent maximization, com-
pulsory = compulsory unitization, No Sharing = firms are not restricted to any
sharing rule, No Time = firms can form units the first period.
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Figure B.1: Field Development under Counterfactuals
Base Compulsory Forced No Time Planner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ProdW 4 5 4 5 4
InjProd 0.56 0.58 0.6 0.55 0.5
ProdPW 46100 45252 56308 43010 43100
ProeW 20489 18855 22523 19550 21550
Unit No No No NA NA
Notes: Each plot compares the development of this specific field under the current policy
vs. under a counterfactual. The table shows how many production wells, the percentage of
injection wells, production per well, and unitization decisions under each counterfactual.
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Figure B.2: Field Development under Counterfactuals
Base Compulsory Forced No Time Planner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ProdW 5 7 5 7 5
InjProd 0.58 0.5 0.58 0.5 0.64
ProdPW 56319 45043 58398 44787 68697
ProeW 23466 22522 24333 22393 24535
Unit No No No NA NA
Notes: Each plot compares the development of this specific field under the current policy
vs. under a counterfactual. The table shows how many production wells, the percentage of
injection wells, production per well, and unitization decisions under each counterfactual.
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Figure B.3: Field Development under Counterfactuals
Base Compulsory Forced No Time Planner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ProdW 6 7 4 7 9
InjProd 0 0 0 0.13 0
ProdPW 8632 8827 8246 9559 9212
ProeW 8632 8827 8246 8364 9212
Unit No No No NA NA
Notes: Each plot compares the development of this specific field under the current policy
vs. under a counterfactual. The table shows how many production wells, the percentage of
injection wells, production per well, and unitization decisions under each counterfactual.
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Figure B.4: Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Time to Unitization
Area vs bargaining parameter
Figure B.5: Bargaining parameters
Area vs bargaining parameter
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